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ABSTRACT 
 
The stable marriage problem, as addressed by Gale and Shapely [1] consists of 
providing a bipartite matching between n “boys” and n “girls” - each of whom have a 
totally ordered preference list over the other set - such that there exists no “boy” and no 
“girl” that would prefer each other over their partner in the matching. In this paper, we 
analyze the cases of strategic play by the “boys” in the game directly inspired by this 
problem. We provide an O(n3) algorithm for determining a matching which is not 
necessarily stable in the Gale-Shapely sense, but it is coalition-stable, in that no player 
has a selfish interest to leave the resulting grand coalition to join any potential 
alternative one which might feasibly form, and is also man-optimal. Thus, under a 
realistic assumption set, no player has an interest to “destabilize” the matching, even 
though he theoretically could. The resulting matching is often better than the naïve 
Gale-Shapely one for some (not all) of the “boys”, being no worse for the rest. This 
matching is more realistic (stable) than the one produced by top-trading-cycles 
method, thus offering a qualitative improvement over the latter. Furthermore, we 
analyze the situation when players are allowed to make strategic threats (i.e. be willing 
to sacrifice their own outcome to hurt others), offer a relevant example to illustrate the 
benefits of this form of play, and ultimately provide an exponential time algorithm which 
tries to determine a good threat-making strategy. We then briefly examine a few other 
non-conventional possibilities a player has to affect his outcome. Most common 
variations to the game model are also described and analyzed with regard to 
applicability of the methods in this paper. Finally, a few examples of real-life problems 
which can be modeled and solved with the methods in this paper are presented. 
 
1. OVERVIEW AND MOTIVATION 
 
Introduction 
 
The statement of the marriage problem consists of the following: 
 A set of n elements B, of “boys” (suitors, proposers, “buyers”, etc.) who are 
interesting in obtaining a match with exactly one of the girls in set G. 
 A set of n elements G, of “girls” (acceptors, “sellers”, etc.) who are interesting in 
obtaining a match with exactly one of the boys in set B. 
 For each boy bi in B, a permutation Pbi of the girls in G, representing his preference 
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list over the girls. A girl which appears earlier in Pbi is preferred by boy bi over one that 
appears later. 
 For each girl gj in G, a permutation Pgj of the boys in B, representing her preference 
list over the boys. A boy which appears earlier in Pgj is preferred by girl gj over one that 
appears later. 
 
By convention, for brevity, I will refer to an element of B as boy bi and to an element of 
G as girl gj, in general.  
 
An interesting case (which is the only one analyzed in this paper) is that when the 
matching is the result of a game played as follows: 
 Every unmatched boy bi proposes to some girl gi in his preference list. 
 Every girl g in the game always keeps her best match (the highest on her 
preference list) among all proposals she received and dumps all the rest 
(including in some cases her former partner).  
 When there are no more unmatched boys, the game ends and the resulting 
matching is the final matching. 
 
Example 1.1: 
B = {b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7} 
G = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7} 
 
Preference of boys, in descending order: 
Pb1 g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7 
Pb2 g2, g4, g1, g3, g5, g6, g7  
Pb3 g2, g3, g1, g4, g5, g6, g7  
Pb4 g1, g2, g7, g6, g5, g3, g4 
Pb5 g3, g2, g1, g4, g5, g6, g7 
Pb6 g6, g5, g1, g2, g3, g4, g7 
Pb7 g4, g7, g1, g2, g3, g5, g6 
 
Preference of girls, in descending order: 
Pg1 b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7 
Pg2 b5, b2, b3, b4, b1, b6, b7 
Pg3 b3, b5, b1, b2, b4, b6, b7 
Pg4 b1, b2, b7, b3, b4, b5, b6 
Pg5 b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7 
Pg6 b6, b4, b1, b2, b3, b4, b5 
Pg7 b1, b2, b3, b5, b6, b7, b4 
 
| 
A solving (or scenario) of the stable marriage problem consists of a bipartite matching 
between the elements of B and the elements of G. A partial solving (partial scenario) 
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consists of a partial matching, with some elements remaining unmatched. 
 
It is interesting to analyze matchings which have some sort of stability property. That is, 
boys will not dump their current partners (in the solving) – and thus become 
unmatched – so that they can then propose to another girl (or girls) in the hope they 
eventually end up better off. Furthermore, the girls must not receive better offers so as 
to jeopardize the matching of their partner boy, leaving him unmatched again. It is 
reasonably conceived that a matching without these kind of stability properties is not a 
realistic solution, since actors within it will have no rational interest to “stick to it” (in the 
problem’s current formulation) and thus will continue the game resulting in a new 
matching. Cases of incomplete information need to be analyzed separately. 
 
Definition 1.2 (strict/Gale-Shapely stability) 
A (complete) solving of a marriage problem instance such that there exists no tuple (bi, 
gj) such that bi ranks higher in gj’s preference lists then her partner in the solving and 
gj ranks higher in bi’s preference lists then his partner in the solving, is called a strictly 
stable solution, or Gale-Shapley-stable. | 
 
Example 1.3: 
For the statement in Example 1.1, the following would be a stable solution. 
S = b1-g1, b2-g4, b3-g3, b4-g5, b5-g2, b6-g6, b7-g7.| 
 
Definition 1.4 (coalition stability) 
A (complete) solving of a marriage problem instance is such that there exists no 
coalition C = {bi1, bi2, … , bik} of boys such that should all of them decide to dump their 
current partners (and thus become unmatched) and then collude in executing a 
strategy of proposing to girls, at least one of them (a boy in C) will be better of with the 
resulting partner and the rest of those in C will be no-worse off, is called a coallition-
stable solution. | 
Discussion: Note that players outside C might also react, so coalition stability refers to 
the entire set B of boys. 
 
The condition that all members of the coalition C are no-worse off is required for the 
common sense intuition that a boy cannot be convinced to become part of a coalition 
that generates a worse of result for him than if he did not join. However, this special 
case is possible for example in cases where preferences can be tied. 
 
Example 1.5: 
For the statement in Example 1.1, the following would be a coalition-stable 
solution. 
S = b1-g1, b2-g4, b3-g2, b4-g5, b5-g3, b6-g6, b7-g7.| 
 
The number of boys and the number of girls does not have to be exactly the same. In 
case there are more girls than boys, some girls will become matched with some 
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“fictitious” boy index above the number of actual boys, signifying in effect that she 
remained unmatched. The same applies conversely if there are more boys than girls. 
 
Prior works 
 
The stable marriage problem was introduced to literature largely by Gale and Shapely 
in [1 - College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, D. Gale and L. S. Shapley, 
1962] where they provided an O(n2) algorithm which produces a stable matching 
between the two groups. A stable matching is one such that there exists no boy and no 
girl such that they both prefer each other over their respective partners in the matching. 
Robert W. Irving studied in [2 – Stable Marriage and indifference, Robert W. Irving, 
1994] the case where the preferences lists allow indifference between different 
partners and provided several algorithms for determining stable matchings (if they 
exist) in such cases. A few fundamental issues concerning strategic play were studied 
in [3 - Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm, L. E. Dubins and D. A. Freedman, 
1981] by Dubins and Freedman where they showed that no coalition of boys can 
improve the outcome for all of them, by lying about their preferences.  In a sequel 
paper [4 - Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem, David Gale and Marilda 
Sotomayor, 1985], Gale and Sotomayor analyzed the case with lying by the girls. In [5 - 
Marriage, honesty, and stability, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, 2005] the 
authors concerned themselves with lying by the boys in matching markets where one 
side only has a constant number of preferences and also acknowledged that “no 
matching mechanism based on a stable marriage algorithm can guarantee truthfulness 
as a dominant strategy for participants”. Another prior paper concerning itself with 
misrepresentation is [6 - Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem, Alvin 
E Roth, 1984]. Some variations to the stable marriage problem concerning the 
simultaneous introduction of ties and seeking a more balanced matching (favoring the 
girls more than in Gale-Shapely) have been shown in [7 - Hard variants of stable 
marriage, David F Manlove, Kazuo Iwama, Shuichi Miyazaki, Yasufumi Morita, 2002] to 
be hard (with regard to NP completeness). A series of existential results concerning 
strategic play in stable marriage problem and some of its variations have been 
presented by Roth in [8 - The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the 
marriage problem, Alvin E Roth]. 
 
In [9 - Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and 
Applications, Chung-Piaw Teo, Jay Sethuraman,Wee-Peng Tan, 1999] the authors 
analyzed strategic play by girls and offered several results. Finally, in [10 - Cheating by 
Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung Huang, 2006], 
Huang analyzed cases of strategic plays by boys consisting of collusion in order to 
achieve a better outcome for some (not all) of them. The novelty was that such 
outcomes are not necessarily stable. They are however no worse than Gale-Shapely 
and are also on the Pareto frontier of outcomes no worse than Gale-Shapely. This 
prompted Huang to imply that such outcome is the best possible for boys. His 
approach consisted of improving a Gale-Shapely matching by discovering and 
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materializing “trading cycles”, using the top-trading-method described in [11 - Pareto 
Optimality in House Allocation Problems, David J. Abraham, Katarína Cechlárová, 
David F. Manlove, Kurt Mehlhorn, 2005]. 
 
A brief survey of results concerning stable marriage problem was published in 2008, in 
[12 - A Survey of the Stable Marriage Problem and Its Variants, Kazuo Iwama, Shuichi 
Miyazaki, 2008] by Iwama and Miyazaki. 
 
A general and very relevant situation where the actual utility gained by men in a 
matching can be modeled in terms of transferable utility (e.g. monetary value) with 
side-payments allowed has been studied by Rahul Jain in [13 - Designing a strategic 
bipartite matching market, Rahul Jain, 2007]. 
 
Overview of this paper 
In this paper we concern ourselves primarily with generating as good an outcome as 
realistically possible for some boy. 
 
The main result of this paper is to provide a more realistic matching than the one by 
[10] for the case where boys are allowed to collude. Our matching more adequately 
accounts for the power and interest boys have to propose successfully to certain girls. 
In the terminology of [10], we claim that Huang’s result is sometimes unrealistic 
because it entails cooperation of more accomplices than needed, with some 
accomplices actually having the incentive to refuse cooperation since they can obtain a 
better outcome (become cabalists in terminology of [10]) if other accomplices (which 
are same off in both cases) support them as well. We provide an illustrating example of 
such a situation in the beginning of Section 3. In that section we also provide an O(n3) 
algorithm to determine such a matching, which we call coalition stable, under the 
explicit assumption set of that section. We also prove that such a coalition stable 
matching is unique and optimal for all men under the Section’s assumptions. 
  
Another important contribution in this paper consists of an analysis in Section 4 of 
cases where boys are allowed to try to persuade others into a coalition with an 
outcome more favorable to them by threatening that in case of non-cooperation the 
latter’s outcome will be degraded much more severely. For such threats to be both 
useful and credible, the player making them must be willing to risk getting a worse 
outcome than Gale-Shapely in case his ultimatums are rejected. We give examples 
showing a number of positive existential results, discuss complexities and traits of the 
ensuing model and progress towards solving the game by offering a super-exponential 
time algorithm to find a strategy which guarantees that some particular boy will be 
matched to a preference at least as good as a fixed one. The algorithm has the 
drawback of producing false negatives occasionally. 
 
In Section 5, we discuss six further possibilities of non-conventional play which might 
affect the outcomes for some boy, namely adding/removing boys/girls, coopting players 
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in coalitions without incentivizing them within the game and making use of drone 
players. We also show how such possibilities might become available to some player 
from a motivational perspective of the involved. 
 
In Section 6, we discuss in reasonable detail six major variations to the game model, 
namely girls with more slots, indifference in the preference lists of boys, boys not 
knowing about all the girls in play, boys not knowing about all other boys, girls as 
players and imperfect information. We provide examples to illustrate the impact such 
variations have on prior results. 
 
Finally, in Section 7 we show how four very relevant real-life games can be modeled as 
stable marriage problem instances and also present an adaptation to the stable 
marriage problem to allow for bids to be submitted by boys alongside proposals which 
can affect how preferred they are in the eyes of the girls. 
  
Motivation 
 
This paper is motivated primarily by the numerous economic situations which can be 
formulated as instances of the stable marriage problem. There are many examples in 
literature.  
 
In Section 7, we discuss four real life games namely Renter-Landlord, Contractor – 
Project, Student – Program placement and Ads placement and analyze how they can 
be modeled as stable marriage problem instances. In the course of doing this we also 
provide an adaptation to stable marriage algorithms allowing a major variation 
pertaining to the contractor – project problem, under which boys are allowed to submit 
bids alongside the proposals which affect (but not solely determine) their rankings in 
the eyes of the girls. We also referenced a fifth game, namely Wireless 
Communications where our results also apply. 
 
For almost all such situation strategic play can play an important role. Because of this, 
we consider important that the limitations of [10] (which is currently to the best of our 
knowledge the state of the art in this regard) are noted the qualitative improvements we 
make and the issues we discuss in this paper are taken into account. 
 
2. PRELIMINARIES 
 
In this section we proceed by introducing some preliminary notions, assumptions and 
basic results. 
 
Assumption 2.1 (girls are robotic players) 
In the framework of the first few sections, girls are considered passive (robotic-players) 
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who always accept the better choice between their then-current partner and the 
proposer. We will therefore use terminology player to refer strictly to some boy.| 
 
For analysis purposes, we need to formalize how this “marriage game” is to be played 
out in real life. That is what proposals / moves are permissible, when does the game 
terminate and what is the outcome of a particular playing out. 
 
Generic game model 2.2 
In the most general case, the game can be viewed as a repeat of the following steps 
until there are no more eligible moves: 
 Does any coupled boy wish to dump his partner? If so, then that boy becoming 
uncoupled again is an eligible “move”, which is realized at that step. 
 Does any uncoupled boy wish to make a proposal? If so, then that proposal is 
an eligible move, which is realized at that step. 
When there are no more eligible moves, the resulting matching is the outcome of the 
game. 
| 
Discussion: There are clearly some problems with this very generic game model 
above. For example, a boy could endlessly move to become uncoupled and then 
propose again to the same girl he was coupled with priory. There are other more 
complex scenarios that can result in an infinite play. 
 
Assumption 2.2 (no proposals which would clearly be rejected) 
One first simplification which does not restrain generality of the generic game model 
above is to eliminate from the set of eligible moves those proposals which would be 
refused (proposals to a girl coupled with someone better than the proposer on her 
preference list), since, with girls being robotic players under the first few sections, we 
know these would be rejected and the resulting matching would not be altered. 
| 
Discussion: For simplification of analysis, we sometimes conventionally still say that a 
boy proposed to a girl who immediately refuses him, as saying that his proposal was 
rejected. In a strict sense we could just as easily consider that he “skipped” making 
that proposal and moved on to the next one (if he had any left). 
 
Assumption 2.3 (no dumping by boys) 
Another simplification we can introduce is that a boy can never spontaneously dump 
his partner – he needs to be “kicked out” by the girl (who under Assumption 2.1 does 
so iff she receives a better proposal than him). 
| 
Discussion: There are some interesting cases of partial information (either with regard 
to preference lists or with regard to gameplay of others) where this assumption is too 
limitative (i.e. it does not model real-life situations). Another potential theoretical issue 
with this assumption is that a boy might theoretically end up with a worse match (in the 
“real-life” play) than his anticipated one because some of the members of his coalition 
did not play “as promised” and therefore nobody “kicked him out” from that “bad” match 
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so he can propose again – while in “real life” he could always dump a partner to make 
another proposal. But these special cases might be discussed separately. For now, we 
keep this simplifying assumption. 
 
Definition 2.4 (naïve / robotic players) 
A boy that plays the game by proposing to the girls in his preference list in decreasing 
order of preference (should he be refused or later kicked out by his earlier preferences) 
and never dumps a partner spontaneously is called a naïve player. | 
 
Should all players in the game be naïve players, the resulting game would be the Gale-
Shapely algorithm and the resulting matching would be the Gale-Shapely matching. In 
[1 - College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, D. Gale and L. S. Shapley, 1962] 
Gale and Shapley showed that such a matching is Gale-Shapely stable. 
 
Definition 2.5 (temperature of girls) 
The index of the boy a specific girl gj is matched to in a particular (final or partial) state 
of the game, is called the temperature of girl gj. | 
 
Notice that for the girls, who are the ones being proposed to, the “quality” of their 
matching can only increase (or stay the same) over time, as they are proposed to by 
more and more boys. Therefore: 
 
Observation 2.6 (non-decreasing temperature of girls) 
The temperature of any girl is non-decreasing throughout the play of the game, under 
Assumption 2.3 (no dumping by boys). | 
Discussion: In theory, the temperature of a girl could go down if she is dumped by her 
then-current partner, thus becoming unmatched. However, for this to happen, the boy 
that at some point proposed to her needs to have a reason to believe he will be better 
off by dumping her and (eventually) proposing to some other girl.  
 
Definition 2.7 (static strategy profiles) 
We say that a player b has a static strategy profile SPb = <gi1, gi2, …, gin> consisting 
of a permutation of all the girl iff he always plays (when uncoupled) to the next girl (to 
the right) from the one he got kicked-out from or would be refused by and also 
originally he plays to gi1.| 
Discussion: Notice that such a player can never propose again to one of his “earlier” 
girls since, by Observation 2.6 (non-decreasing temperature of girls) that girl would be 
already out of his reach. Notice also, that a player playing a static strategy profile need 
not be a naïve player under Definition 2.4: he could just as well not propose the first 
time to his most preferred girl, for example. 
A further noteworthy observation for static strategy profiles is that often-times players 
may be forced to submit such profiles to some central authority (for example in 
student-university matching) who then simulates the execution of these strategies to 
produce a final outcome. The players in such a situation would have no option to play a 
“dynamic” strategy profile which takes into account “on-the-fly” what happens in the 
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game as other players propose. We shall see that in a range of situations static 
strategy profiles are sufficiently generic, however not always. 
 
Assumption 2.8 (all players have static strategy profiles) 
For the first few sections we will assume that all players have static strategy profiles.| 
Discussion: This assumption was made implicitly by Huang in [10 - Cheating by Men in 
the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung Huang, 2006] for example 
when he considered that strategic play in the marriage problem consisted only of 
“falsifying preference lists” by the boys who would then be coupled according to Gale-
Shapely under these new “falsified” lists. The payoff to each was, of course, the rank of 
resulting partner under the true preference lists. 
 
Lemma 2.9 (if all players have static strategy profiles, the order in which they 
propose is irrelevant) 
Assuming Assumption 2.3 (no dumping by the boys) holds, 
The order in which uncoupled boys make proposals, in order, from their respective 
static strategy profiles is irrelevant to the final resulting matching so long as they will 
always get a chance to propose when uncoupled. 
 
Essentially we are saying that if we can allow the matching to proceed “step-by-step”, 
allowing at each “step” only one uncoupled boy to make a proposal (to either be 
accepted or rejected). And that it is irrelevant how we chose the boy of any step: the 
resulting matching is the same in all cases. 
 
Proof: 
First, let’s brake the simultaneity of proposals by choosing some arbitrary order among 
proposals that come “at the same time”. If the proposals are to the same girl, this 
clearly poses no problem since the outcome of any arbitrary sequential order will be 
the same as the simultaneous case: she will keep her best preference among the set. 
In case there are two simultaneous proposals for different girls, again the outcome of 
choosing a particular order over them is the same as the outcome of girls choosing 
simultaneously: each girl will accept the suiter iff he beats her then-current match. 
 
Without loss of generality, thus assume that the boys propose in some particular order. 
For example:  
 
b1:f1, b2:f4, b3:f2, b4:f1, b1:f4, b2:f2, b3:f3, … 
where bi:gj signifies “boy bi proposes to girl gj” at that particular time index in 
the game. 
 
Notice that for a boy to make a certain proposal at a particular time index he must have 
either been kicked-out from or rejected by all his “earlier” girls in the static strategy 
profile. 
Notice then that if at a certain time index a boy b is at a certain position on his static 
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strategy profile with g being the next proposal he would make (if he was the one to “get 
the microphone” at the particular time index to make the proposal), forever thereafter 
until b finally gets to make his proposal to g, b’s next play will be at g. This follows 
immediately by the definition 2.7 (static strategy profile). Furthermore, since b was 
uncoupled at that time index, he will for sure get a chance to make his proposal to g 
eventually. 
Now we will show that indeed it would make no difference to the final outcome if b was 
to propose to g at this earlier time index rather than at the time index he actually 
proposed at in the initial arbitrary order. Since we chose b arbitrarily, as we move from 
one time index to the next, we can always choose whatever candidate b we wish to be 
the one “who gets the microphone” to propose instead of the one who got it in the 
arbitrary initial order. Thus, if we prove that “nothing changes” in the final result when 
we move b’s proposal to g arbitrarily earlier on (but still to a valid position – so to a 
time when he is uncoupled and he already has proposed unsuccessfully to all his prior 
girls in the static strategy profile), then we have shown that any valid arbitrary order 
produces the same final result. 
 
But indeed, moving b’s proposal to g earlier on than the moment he actually made it 
has no net effect. Consider the original segment of play: 
prefix bt:ft middle b:g suffix, where we have that instead of bt:ft we would like to have 
b:g. 
It follows that both bt and b were uncoupled at the time. Then the segment 
prefix b:g bt:ft middle suffix, would be still be a valid play and produce the same 
result. 
Notice in particular that by prefix, middle and suffix we just mean a valid sequence of 
proposals – the proposals in middle in the first case might have different outcomes 
than those in middle in the second case. However, they would still remain valid and 
produce the same end result. We can argue by induction on the time index of a 
proposal right after b:g: if the boy say bx was eligible to propose to say gx at that time 
index in the original order, he will also be eligible to propose at that time index (+1 for 
adding b:g before) to gx. The outcome of the proposal may not be the same of course, 
but notice that the temperature of girl gx being proposed to (by bx) is no less that in 
was in the initial order at that time index (also by induction). 
| 
 
Now, under Assumption 2.3 and 2.8, due to Lemma 2.9 we can introduce an even nicer 
simplified model of the game which does not restrict generality (produces the same 
outcome) as the generic model 2.2: 
 
Simplified Game Model 2.10 
Assume the gameplay is modeled as follows. 
A game consists of the following steps: 
1. We consider each boy from b1 to bn in order and for each one we will make 
the opening play of round i, which thus starts with boy bi’s proposal. At the 
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end of each round, all boys from 1 to i are matched (temporarily) to some 
partner. 
2. During each round i we consider that boys make proposals as such: The 
(sole) uncoupled boy (from the first i) proposes to the next girl in his static 
strategy profile. This results either in all first i boys being coupled (i.e. he 
proposed to an uncoupled girl) or again some boy (perhaps the same) being 
uncoupled. The round then continues (with the sole uncoupled boy 
proposing) until every boy is coupled. 
 
The matching which remained after all n rounds (after boy bn’s round) is considered the 
final result. 
| 
 
We refer to the order in which the boys propose (potentially some more than once) 
under a set of static strategy profiles as the canonical order of proposals. 
 
Notation 2.11 (play) 
We use the following notation to denote the “play” within any round of the generic 
game play algorithm described above: …bxfy(bt)|bz…fz, with the meaning that bx 
proposed to fy and as a result bz (we can have bz = bx) was “expelled” from fy (losing to 
bt) and went on to propose to some other girl and so on until some boy proposed to fz, 
who was uncoupled, ending the round. We call each portion separated by | an element 
of the play. Sometimes we omit the parenthesis (like (bt)) since it is obvious who was 
the victor in that element by analyzing the next element in the play. 
| 
 
Example 2.12 
Here’s an example of the execution of the Gale-Shapely algorithm for example 1.1 in 
the above notation: 
Round b1: b1g1. 
Round b2: b2g2. 
Round b3: b3g2(b2)|b3g3. 
Round b4: b4g1(b1)|b4g2(b2)|b4g7. 
Round b5: b5g3(b3)|b5g2(b5)|b2g4. 
Round b6: b6g6. 
Round b7: b7g4(b2)|b7g7(b7)|b4g6(b6)|b4g5. 
 
The final matching is: b1-g1, b2-g4, b3-g3, b4-g5, b5-g2, b6-g6, b7-g7. 
| 
  
Now, what about trading? Given some complete matching, improving upon that would 
imply that some boy b1 leaves his current partner g1 for another, say g2, who is left by 
say b2 who chooses then g3, who was dumped by b3 and so on, until some boy 
closes the chain by choosing g1.  
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Notation 2.13 (trading cycle) 
We use the following notation to denote a switching of partners in a full matching: 
fy|bxfz|bz…fy, with the meaning that boy bx dumps his then-current partner fy 
and goes to propose (and be accepted) by girl fz who was just dumped by bz and so 
on, until a boy proposes to the original (now uncoupled) girl fy. 
 
We call such a changing of partners a “trading cycle”. 
| 
Discussion: Notice that under Assumption 2.3 (no dumping by the boys), trading cycles 
cannot be materialized once the matching has been played out. They could however, 
be agreed on beforehand and the strategy of each player altered accordingly to 
consider such cycles. 
 
Example 2.14 
Here’s an example of a trading cycle for the Gale-Shapely matching of Example 1.1. 
 
g3|b3g2|b5g3. 
The new matching is then: b1-g1, b2-g4, b3-g2, b4-g5, b5-g3, b6-g6, b7-g7. 
| 
 
Notice that the matching in Example 2.14 is not Gale-Shapely stable, because b2 is 
preferred by g2 over b3, her now-current partner and also b2 prefers g2 over his 
current partner, g4. Thus b2 tacit agreement is required for such a matching to 
materialize. 
 
3. MAIN RESULT AND ALGORITHM 
 
It might be useful to refresh the Gale-Shapely algorithm by consulting [1 - College 
Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, D. Gale and L. S. Shapley, 1962] (for brief 
overview see also https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Stable_marriage_problem). The 
algorithm is a particular execution of the simplified generic game model 2.10, where 
each uncoupled boy proposes each time to the most preferred girl by him, he hasn’t 
yet proposed to, thus being a naïve player (also being a player with a static strategy 
profile).  
 
The main result of this section is an algorithm which determines a matching which is an 
optimal result for all (i.e. any) boys: in that no other feasible coalition could offer any of 
them a better result, without making someone else (in that hypothetical coalition) 
strictly worse-off.  
The main issue (and also difference from the works in [10 - Cheating by Men in the 
Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung Huang, 2006]) is what we 
consider to be a feasible coalition. We shall substantiate our claim that our 
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assumptions are much more realistic than the implicit ones made in [10].  
 
In this section, Assumption 2.1 (girls are robotic players), Assumption 2.3 (no dumping 
by the boys), Assumption 2.8 (all players have static strategy profiles) hold. The game 
model is the Simplified Game Model 2.10.  
 
In this section we shall use the following example problem to illustrate concepts and 
algorithms: 
   
Example 3.1 
B = {b1, b2, b3, b4, b5, b6, b7} 
G = {g1, g2, g3, g4, g5, g6, g7} 
 
Preference of boys, in descending order (only relevant ones): 
Pb1 g1 
Pb2 g2, g3, g5, g7 
Pb3 g5, g3 
Pb4 g3, g2,  
Pb5 g3, g5, g4 
Pb6 g3, g6 
Pb7 g2, g6, g5 
 
Preference of girls, in descending order (only over relevant boys): 
Pg1 b1 
Pg2 b4, b2, b7 
Pg3 b3, b6, b2, b5, b4 
Pg4 b5 
Pg5 b7, b2, b5, b3 
Pg6 b6, b7 
Pg7 b2 
 
| 
 
Note what would an execution of the naïve static strategy profile for each boy (the 
Gale-Shapely matching) imply for Example 3.1: 
 
Example 3.2 
Round b1: b1g1. 
Round b2: b2g2. 
Round b3: b3g5. 
Round b4: b4g3. 
Round b5: b5g3|b4g2|b2g3|b5g5|b3g3|b2g5|b5g4. 
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Round b6: b6g3(b3)|b6g6. 
Round b7: b7g2(b4)|b7g6(b6);b7g5|b2g7. 
 
The final matching would be: b1-g1; b2-g7; b3-g3; b4-g2; b5-g4; b6-g6; b7-g5. | 
 
Notice that the final matching in Example 3.2 is strictly stable (Gale-Shapely stable).  
Notice however, that it admits a trading cycle: g2|b4g3|b3g5|b7g2. 
 
Notice also that under this trading cycle all of b3, b4 and b7 would get their first choice. 
Thus, under the works in [10 - Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching 
Algorithm, Chien-Chung Huang, 2006], considering the proposed method described in 
[11 - Pareto Optimality in House Allocation Problems, David J. Abraham, Katarína 
Cechlárová, David F. Manlove, Kurt Mehlhorn, 2005] this cycle would surely be part of 
the final “optimal” coalition. The required “accomplices” in terms of [10] are b2, b5 and 
b6 (all those with legitimate direct veto power, not already in the coalition). But is this 
“right”? Well, we claim no, for the following reason. In the ensuing hypothetical 
matching, b6 could oust b4 from g3. Such a hypothetical possible resulting play would 
be:  
b6 (dumps g6)g3|b4g2|b7g6. 
 
The final matching would thus be: b1-g1; b2-g7; b3-g5; b4-g2; b5-g4; b6-g3; b7-g6.  
Those same-off are in black, those better off are in green, those worse off are in red 
(if to them there would be no improvement over Gale-Shapely) or in yellow (if worse 
off than in the first case, but still be better off than with Gale-Shapely). This could be a 
matching directly proposed by some other coalition than in the first case. 
The required accomplices for new proposed coalition would be, under the works in 
[10], just b2 and b5.  
 
Notice that in the latter case we need just a subset of the same accomplices we need 
in the first case. Furthermore, notice that the only players worse off in the latter than in 
the former, b4 and b7, do not hold legitimate veto power in the latter. Furthermore, 
these worse-off players have no recourse in destabilizing the coalition without hurting 
themselves by risking ending up with a worse match than they would get under the 
coalition (which is still Gale-Shapely or better for all). Note however that b7 could “take 
revenge” by playing at g5, but this would entail a worse outcome for himself. This 
situation will be discussed in the subsequent section. For now, it is sufficient to note 
that should “the grumpy” b4 and b7 simply be naïve players, their cooperation is not 
required for the coalition (all the rest can simply put their coalition partner – in the latter 
case – as their first option). 
 
This example, while it does not contradict any theorems in [10] (since in the latter case 
there are some boys worse off, thus the theorem does not apply), it does contradict the 
philosophy of what is “the best possible outcome” for each individual boy. For [10], the 
answer would be the former coalition above for Example 3.1. However, the latter 
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coalition is clearly the feasible one among the two, even if some boys are worse off in it 
than in the former. This is because those worse off are without power with regard to the 
proposed outcome, which is something neglected in [10]. 
 
Before we provide an algorithm to determine the optimal feasible coalition for some 
boys, we need to formalize a few notions so as to understand what feasible means for 
instance. The language used above also employed some definitions detailed below. 
 
Definition 3.3 (simple coalition) 
A coalition is a tuple <C, Mc> where C is a subset of the set of boys B, and Mc is a 
“promise matching” for the each of the boys in C. The coalition is characterized by the 
promise of each boy b in C to propose first to Mc(b) and never dump her unless kicked-
out (thus when the coalition fails).  
| 
Discussion: In effect, it can be said that boy b will propose just to Mc(b) if the coalition 
holds. 
 
Definition 3.4 (direct veto power) 
A player with direct veto power over a coalition <C, Mc> is a boy b such there is a pair 
(b1, Mc(b1)) in Mc such that Mc(b1) prefers b over b1. It is essentially the case that b 
could destroy the promised outcome Mc of the coalition by proposing to a girl which 
would accept him over the partner to whom she is promised in the coalition. 
| 
 
Definition 3.5 (legitimate direct veto power) 
A player with legitimate direct veto power over a coalition <C, Mc> is a boy b which 
holds direct veto power, particularly in that he would be preferred over her coalition 
partner by a girl g in Mc who ranks higher in his preference list than Mc(b). Essentially 
this is a player that would be accepted by a girl he prefers better than his promised 
partner. 
| 
Discussion: Note that a player with legitimate direct veto power might not actually get 
his more preferred girl if he exercises his veto, as the other players react as they are 
being kicked out, making new proposals (firstly the one he replaces).  
 
A coalition is called feasible iff none of the players having direct veto power have an 
interest to exercise any veto. 
 
There is a thorny issue of determining a motivation for becoming part of a coalition. Or, 
conversely, determining there is a lack of motivation (lack of interest) to veto a 
coalition. As we shall see, some boys are “hopeless” – they cannot hope to improve 
their partner in any coalition. However, they could theoretically still veto some 
coalitions, at no cost to them (even assuming no suicidal players). All this relates to 
defining the notion of what is “the best possible partner” for some boy b. Clearly a “best 
possible partner” for any boy b could depend also on how the other boys play. 
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Definition 3.6 (suicidal play/player) 
We call suicidal a play by boy b play to girl g that is worse in his preference list than 
the partner Gale-Shapely’s algorithm would assign to him, while he still has the 
opportunity to play to one of his Gale-Shapely partner – or better girls and be 
accepted. 
A player making a suicidal play is called suicidal player. 
We call a player that is not suicidal as being conservative. 
| 
Discussion: Such a player is called suicidal because, as shown in Lemma 3.7, he could 
certainly get a better outcome for himself, assuming there are no other suicidal players, 
simply by being conservative instead of suicidal. 
 
Lemma 3.7 (Gale-Shapely is worse case outcome with no suicidal players) 
The Gale-Shapely matching is worse-case partner for any boy, assuming no suicidal 
players.  
It is guaranteed that no boy b ends up worse off than with his Gale-Shapely partner 
unless at least some other boy decides to deliberately make himself worse off (at least 
temporarily) than in the Gale-Shapely matching. 
 
Proof:  
Assume all players are conservative. Take some arbitrary boy b. We will show that b 
can never end up worse-off than in Gale-Shapely. 
 
Since b is a conservative player, he first “tries out” girls higher up on his preference list 
than the Gale-Shapely partner (in some order, not necessarily strictly decreasing order 
of preference). If he ends up coupled with one of them, then his is no worse off than 
Gale-Shapely.  
Now consider b’s proposal to his Gale-Shapely partner g. Who can “beat” b at girl g? 
Clearly those boys {b1,…,bk} which rank higher than b on g’s preference list. 
However, since g is b’s Gale-Shapely partner, it follows that none of {b1,…,bk} ever 
propose to g (otherwise her temperature would go irremediably above b) in the course 
of that algorithm. This means all of {b1,…,bk} have a better Gale-Shapley partner than 
g (otherwise they would propose to g and those she would no longer be b’s Gale-
Shapely partner). 
 
Now, for b to be kicked out of g, one of these boys would need to propose to g. This is 
of course theoretically possible (and plays a role in the variant of the game with threat 
points and ultimatums), but should a player, say b1, do this, b1 would become 
(temporarily) partnered with a girl worse than with his Gale-Shapely partner and b 
would become unmatched. If b does not ever play such that he triggers a chain 
reaction eventually freeing b1 from g (for example, if b plays to an uncoupled girl), b1 
would remain stuck with his less preferred girl, g. Why would b1 ever propose to g? He 
is either suicidal as defined above, sacrificing a certainly better outcome for himself, 
OR all his partners down until g have already been “taken”, including thus his Gales-
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Shapely one. But b1’s Gale Shapely partner must have been taken by some b2, who 
again is either suicidal or again had his Gale Shapely partner taken by some b3 (notice 
that b, b1, b2, b3, … are all distinct since they each ended up with a different partner – 
namely the prior boy’s Gale Shapely partner), and so on. This leads to a direct chain of 
boys who had their partners “hijacked”. Since all boys on this chain are distinct, it 
follows that the one at the end of the chain has not been hijacked but is suicidal. 
 
Thus, for b it is guaranteed that he will get at least his Gale-Shapely partner, unless 
some player is suicidal, deliberately deciding to make himself worse-off than he could 
(without requiring any cooperation from anyone other than from all to not be suicidal).  
| 
Discussion: A special case that was easily dismissed was when after having been 
thrown out by b1 from his Gale-Shapely partner g, the boy b makes a play that 
eventually throws b1 out of g. For example, consider the play 
b1g(b1)|bg2(b)|b3g(b3)|b1… . Notice that in this case, after irremediably 
kicking b out of g, b1 becomes again free and could just as well propose to his Gale-
Shapely partner, with whom he might actually end up coupled (for example if this 
partner is not g2). Thus b1 has a no-loss threat over b: “You will not get g!”. However, 
it is required that b does not punish b1 by playing to a girl which would not set in action 
such a chain reaction freeing b1 again, otherwise b1 would himself be worse off. 
Notice however that g2, might as well be b’s next preferred girl after g. Thus b should 
deviate from being a naïve player if he doesn’t get his Gale-Shaply partner if he wants 
to punish the suicidal b1. 
 
Definition 3.8 (revenge of b4) 
Consider the following segment of play  
P = b1g(b1)|b4g2(b4)|b3g(b3)|b1…g2|b4… . 
Notice that b1 kicks b4 out of g. In turn, b4 indirectly kicks b1 out of g. Furthermore, 
due to b1 move’s, eventually b4 also gets kicked out of g2 (by b1 directly or potentially 
by some other player), becoming free to propose to whomever he wants. Essentially, 
b4 can take revenge on b1 for having been kicked out of g, with no adverse 
consequences to himself: he can play to a lesser preferred choice g2, knowing that he 
will eventually also be thrown out of there and thus free to propose to his real next 
choice after g. 
We call this situation revenge of b4. | 
 
Assumption 3.9 (no suicidal plays permitted) 
For the remainder of this section, we assume that players are prohibited from taking 
suicidal plays.  
| 
Discussion: The assumption above also excludes using threats of suicidal plays as a 
form of extorting an agreement by some other players for a better coalition matching. 
Essentially it is as if suicidal plays are not permissible by the rules of the game. 
 
Definition 3.10 (promises) 
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We say that a player b makes a promise PromNotPlay(b | C) = {g1,g2,..,gk}, if he 
agrees to bind himself to playing not playing at any of {g1,g2,..,gk} so long as 
condition C is met. 
While players are free not to make promises, we assume that once they make a 
promise, it is binding: they are no longer “allowed” to play in a manner which breaks it. 
 
We consider a special case of promise: Coal(b, g) = Prom(b | Mc(b)=g) = {gi | gi is not 
g} to mean that b promises that he will not play to any of his remaining preferences, so 
long as everybody in the coalition C promises to not play at g. Any static strategy 
profile can easily be adjusted to conform to such a promise, simply by placing Mc(b) as 
the first move and then shifting the remaining prefix of moves in some prior profile to 
the right by one. 
| 
 
Now we ask ourselves: what makes a coalition feasible? When can we expect players 
to be willing to make the coalition promise? We know from Lemma 3.7 and Assumption 
3.9 that no one can end up worse off than Gale-Shapely. So clearly no promises by 
anyone offered less than this outcome will be possible. One intuition is when each 
player seeks to get “the best possible outcome” for himself. Actually this is a very 
useful intuition to determine an optimal coalition matching, letting a side for a moment 
the technical formalization of what “the best possible outcome” means. For example, in 
the situation discussed around Example 3.1, we noticed two possible coalitions (one 
giving b4 his first choice and one giving b6 his first choice). We noted that both 
coalitions needed the backing (the coalition promise) of b2 and b5, among possible 
others. Note that it is conceivable (as is the case with some situations analyzed in 
subsequent sections) that b2 or b5 or both have a strict preference of one of this 
coalitions over the other, even though they individually get the same outcome in both. 
Since their cooperation is strictly required for any of these two coalitions to materialize, 
the first coalition might theoretically end up being the one “played out”, if b6 is 
convinced for example that b5 will never agree to the second coalition and always 
plays at g5 and thus be certain that his individual outcome in the first coalition is “the 
best possible outcome”. This of course requires that b6 be content with getting his 
“best-worse” possible outcome “without a fight” (since b6 is a required member of the 
first coalition), giving up a potentially better outcome vetoed by b5 for no personal gain 
of his own. 
 
To address such issues, as a starting point, we introduce a further simplifying 
assumption. 
 
Assumption 3.10 (self-interest and no taking of sides) 
We consider that each player b is interested strictly about optimizing his own individual 
outcome. As such we require that the sole measure of how “good” a coalition <C, Mc> 
is to him is Mc(b). Thus, we require that if he “supports” a coalition <C, Mc> offering him 
outcome Mc(b)=g (by making the coalition promise to play at g first and never dump 
her spontaneously) he will support any coalition <C’, M’c> also offering M’c(b) = g. 
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In essence, this assumption states that a boy will be indifferent how the remaining boys 
“divide” the remaining girls among themselves, so long as he himself gets the same 
outcome. 
| 
Discussion: There are interesting cases (with which we will concern ourselves in the 
following sections) when players have a stake in supporting some other player over yet 
another. Thus, while they cannot improve their own fate, they might decide to support / 
veto coalitions such that they favor some other players over the rest. However, as a 
starting point we disallow such motivations in this section. 
 
Definition 3.11 (order of preference over coalitions) 
Notice that, under Assumption 3.10 a partial order relationship <b can be defined on 
the set of possible coalitions {<C, Mc>} from the perspective of player b’s preference 
for them. For example, for the two coalitions, let’s name them in order C1 and C2, 
discussed with regard to example 3.1, we can say that C1 <b6 C2 and C2 <b4 C1. 
| 
Discussion: Under Assumption 3.10, notice that if (not C1<bC2) and (not C2<bC1), then 
C1 and C2 offer the same outcome to b and he is thus indifferent among them (they 
can be called of equal preference to b). Thus we can also define =b as a relationship 
and say simply C1 =b C2. Similarly, we have ≤b. 
 
Everything is nice; players can now compare coalitions to determine which they like 
better. But how do they find out which (one or several with the same outcome for them) 
they like best? Again the question boils down to what is an “optimal outcome” for some 
boy. If there are no coalitions, and all players are naïve the result is bare Gale-Shapely. 
But the point is to have coalitions. And coalitions require cooperation which entails 
“settling” for some outcome and not trying to get a better one. But the point of 
coalitions is to produce some better outcome for the player joining, or, more 
importantly, not produce a worse outcome for him had he not joined. 
 
Definition 3.12 (infeasible coalitions) 
We call a coalition implies some set of player making promises or plays which go 
against the assumption set of the game model as infeasible. | 
 
Observation 3.13 (coalitions offering worse than Gale-Shapely are infeasible) 
Under Assumption 3.9 (no suicidal plays permitted), given our Definition 3.3 (simple 
coalition) we can notice that any coalition offering a member an outcome below his 
Gale-Shapely matching is infeasible. | 
Discussion: Not only is such a coalition directly forbidden by the assumptions (axioms) 
of the game, namely Assumption 3.9, but also it would not make sense anyway (under 
Assumption 3.9) since by Lemma 3.7 any player who is asked to accept a suicidal 
outcome could do strictly better by ending up with his Gale-Shapely partner. 
 
Lemma 3.14 (the hopeless men of a marriage problem instance) 
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We claim that for any marriage problem, there exists (at least) one hopeless man for 
which any coalition offering him above his worse-case Gale-Shapely outcome is 
infeasible. 
Proof: 
Consider all the final men to propose (those who ended up coupled with a then-vacant 
girl and were never challenged) in an execution of the Gale-Shapley’s algorithm for the 
specific problem instance. For Example 3.1, as shown in Example 3.2, they are b2, 
and b5. There must be at least one such man. Consider any man b from this set, who 
ends up coupled in Gale-Shapely with g. 
 
Assume for the sake of contradiction there would exist some coalition <C, Mc>, offering 
Mc(b) better than g. 
Who are b’s better preferences? Say {g1,…,gk}. By the very nature of the Gale-
Shapely algorithm, each of these {g1,…,gk} girls ended up coupled with some boy, say 
the corresponding one in {b1,…,bk}. Since by the nature of Gale-Shapley’s algorithm, 
b did propose to all of {g1,…,gk}, (and was rejected or ousted) before settling for g, it 
follows that the temperature of any such girl is above b at the end of the execution of 
the algorithm. 
Now say that Mc(b) = g1. Since g1 prefers b1 over b, it follows that b1 must himself 
never propose to g1, otherwise, by Observation 2.6 (non-decreasing temperature of 
girls), b will never have a chance. But g1 is b1’s Gale-Shapely partner. If <C, Mc> were 
to offer b1 a worse partner than g1, the coalition would be infeasible under 
Observation 3.13 (coalitions offering worse than Gale-Shapely are infeasible). It thus 
follows that Mc(b1) must offer b1 a match above his Gale-Shapely one (who was just 
taken by b). 
Inductively, we can show then that b1 then takes the Gale-Shapely partner of some b2, 
who in turn takes the Gale-Shapley partner of some b3 and so on. In essence, we 
would need to have a trading cycle g|bg1|b1g2|b2…gt|btgt+1, where gi is 
bi’s Gale-Shapely partner and each bi leaves gi voluntarily (he is not ousted by bi-1) 
and moves to the better partner gi+1 conveniently vacated by bi+1. Notice it is not the 
case of actual partner-dumping (breaking Assumption 2.3) – since no actual “play” is 
taken so far, just a simulation of Gale-Shapely – merely a representation of what 
assigning g1 to b implies. Notice that the final girl on the trading cycle is gt+1. She is 
clearly none of the previous girls {g1,…,gt} since she would be “offered” to some prior 
boy by Mc. But since she is necessarily free at this point, and, by induction a better 
match for bt, it follows that bt must have proposed to gt in Gale-Shapely and was 
eventually ousted. Since she is free now, and is none of {g1,…,gt} it follows gt = g, the 
sole “newly free” girl. But, by our definition of b, b was never challenged at g and never 
ousted anyone. This means bt did not even propose to g in the Gale-Shapely 
algorithm. But this is not possible under that algorithm since all boys propose to all 
better preferred girls than their final match in Gale-Shapely (being naïve players). Thus 
a contradiction. 
 
It follows that any coalition <C, Mc> offering b better than g is infeasible. Since b was 
chosen arbitrarily from the set of men who end up with an uncoupled partner 
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unchallenged under Gale-Shapley’s algorithm, it follows that all such men are 
hopeless. 
 
For them, the best possible outcome is the same as the worst possible outcome by 
Lemma 3.7. 
| 
 
Notice that these hopeless men do play a crucial role in most coalitions. Like b2 and 
b5 for Example 1.1. Their cooperation is required for the others to attain a better 
outcome. 
 
Definition 3.15 (optimal potential outcome) 
We say that player b has optimal potential outcome Opt(b) iff any coalition offering b 
better than Opt(b) is infeasible. 
| 
Discussion: The best outcome Opt(b) is not necessarily attainable by b under any set 
of assumptions (due to the plays of the other players). However, under the 
assumptions of this section, we shall see that Opt(b) is properly defined for all b and 
furthermore that each player will attain this optimum. 
 
Notice that for the discussion in Example 1.1, both coalitions described are so far 
feasible under the current assumption model. Therefore, we introduce a new 
assumption: 
 
Assumption 3.16 (predilection towards cooperation) 
We require that a player b supports a coalition that offers him Opt(b). 
| 
Discussion: By Assumption 3.10 (self-interest and no taking of sides), player b will 
support any and all such coalitions offering him Opt(b). In fact, b can materialize this 
Assumption simply by adhering to the coalition promise that he plays first to Opt(b). 
This way he supports any coalition offering him Opt(b). Given that Assumption 2.8 (all 
players have static strategy profiles) also applies to this section, we can just fix the first 
element of player b’s static strategy profile as Opt(b). 
 
Assumptions 3.10 (self-interest and no taking of sides) and 3.16 (predilection towards 
cooperation) says that essentially a player will strategize only to make himself strictly 
better off and if he has determined an optimum he can attain he does not care how 
other players divide the remaining girls so long as he is not hurt. 
 
Notice that both coalitions discussed for Example 1.1 are still feasible under our 
assumption model (and furthermore both are supported by b2 and b5). It starts to 
become clear under this model however that the former coalition discussed there 
(requiring b6 to cooperate to get a worse outcome for himself) should not be 
considered “valid”, given the existence of the latter one. 
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Definition 3.17 (elementary required support set) 
In order for a coalition <C,Mc> to hold, and offer outcomes Mc, there exists a set 
S0(<C, Mc>) of players who must necessarily support the coalition C by refraining from 
playing at a girl who would accept them but who is promised to someone else in the 
coalition. It is thus the set of people with direct veto power over coalition <C,Mc>. 
| 
 
Definition 3.18 (current worse case outcome) 
For any player b we denote by Worse(b) and name current worse case outcome the 
best outcome he could certainly attain given the assumptions of the game model and 
the current promises in play by other players, irrespective of what other players play 
(within these assumptions and promises of course). 
 
Under Assumption 2.8 (all players have static strategy profiles), it can be regarded as 
if, for any potential strategy profile of player b, all possible strategy profiles of all the 
other boys (which are valid under the assumptions and promises of the game) are tried 
out and the worse outcome is picked for the original strategy profile of b. Then the 
strategy profile with the best such worse case outcome is picked to represent the 
current worse case outcome. 
| 
 
Definition 3.19 (relative suicidal plays) 
We call relatively suicidal a play by a boy b to a girl g1 who is worse off for him than 
his current worse case outcome Worse(b), before having played to Worse(b) first.  
We call such a player a relative suicidal player. 
| 
Discussion: Note that it could be argued that playing to g first does not necessarily 
guarantee player b his current worse case current outcome, since the strategy profile 
which guarantees g could entail proposing to some less preferred girl first. However, 
under the current assumption set we shall see that this is not the case. Furthermore, 
we can regard this definition as requiring a player to “at least try” to get his guaranteed 
worse case outcome, before proposing to someone worse. 
 
And finally, our last assumption for this section: 
 
Assumption 3.20 (no relative suicidal plays) 
Relative suicidal plays are forbidden. There are no relatively suicidal players. 
| 
Discussion: Notice that this assumption explicitly excludes the possibility that some 
players could use threats of relative suicidal plays to get for themselves outcomes 
which are far better than for example their then-current worse case outcome under this 
Assumption 3.20. Remember also the special case about revenge of b4, where b4 
hurts other players before ending up same-off as if he didn’t. While in the generic 
sense revenge of b4 is not self-harmful to b4, it is excluded under this Assumption 3.16 
(predilection towards cooperation). Thus, right now, players are not allowed to sacrifice 
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the quality of their own outcome in ultimatums. 
 
Note that finally, under Assumption 3.20, the latter (second) coalition in the discussion 
of Example 3.1 at the start of this section must have the tacit support of b7 since his 
worst case outcome (given that b2 and b5 cooperate with any coalition) is g6, which 
he attains under this coalition. As such, his “revenge” play at g5 is excluded as being 
relatively suicidal. Notice that also b4 cannot play any lower than g2 by the same 
argument. Furthermore, the former (first) coalition becomes infeasible since it would 
entail b6 refraining from playing at his thus worse-case outcome of g3. 
 
Care should be taken when performing analysis such as the above, for if we were, for 
example to consider that b7 gives an “ultimatum” that he will play g2,g5 first, “no 
matter what”, then we will conclude the latter coalition is infeasible and the former 
materializes. However the sequence g2,g5 is a relatively suicidal play for b7 and thus 
is excluded under Assumption 3.20. 
 
Theorem 3.21 
There exists a unique matching Mc for some grand coalition <C, Mc>, such that, under 
Assumptions 3.20 (no relative suicidal plays), 3.16 (predilection towards cooperation) 
and 3.10 (self-interest and no taking of sides), Mc(b) = Opt(b) for all b in B. 
Thus, such matching Mc is coalition-stable under these assumptions. 
| 
 
Consider the algorithm below: 
 
Algorithm 3.22 
The following algorithm determines a coalition-stable matching, under Assumptions 
3.20, 3.16 and 3.10: 
 
1: Let B, G, Pb and Pg be the set of boys, set of girls and preferences of 
boys/girls respectively. 
2: Set Result  Empty_set. 
3: While(|B|>0) { 
4: Let (b,g) be some last pairing produced by running Gale-Shapely(B,G,Pb,Pg), 
namely the element where some boy, b proposes last to some free girl g and is 
never challenged there by anyone. 
5: Set Result  Result U {(b,g)}, thus adding the pair (b,g) to the final solution, for 
all such pairs. 
6: Set B = B \ {b} and G = G \ {g}, thus eliminating both b and g from the 
problem, for all such pairs. 
7: } 
8: Output Result. 
 
Proof: 
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By Lemma 3.7 (Gale-Shapely is worse case outcome with no suicidal plays) we have 
that Worse(b)=g for all pairs found at the first iteration of line 4. Also, by Lemma 3.14 
(the hopeless men of a marriage problem instance) we have further that Opt(b) = g. 
Thus, at the first iteration the hopeless men of Gale-Shapely get coupled with their 
best-case-same-as-worse-case partners. 
By Assumptions 3.16 (predilection towards cooperation) and 3.10 (self-interest and no 
taking of sides), all these b’s will support any coalition which offers then Opt(b). Thus 
all b’s will all make the binding promise to play at Opt(b) first. Since Opt(b) is also 
Worse(b), this will be their only play under the current assumption set, no matter what 
other players do (they can never get kicked out from Opt(b)=Worse(b) since this would 
entail existence of suicidal players [by Lemma 3.7], which in turn is directly excluded by 
the more general Assumption 3.20 (no relative suicidal plays)). 
Furthermore, by Lemma 3.7 (Gale-Shapely is worse case outcome with no suicidal 
plays), we have for any boy bi that the potential match for him by Gale-Shapely in line 
4 is Worse(bi) under the current (empty) promise set. 
 
By induction on the number of the iteration of lines 4-6, assume that all boys bi from 
prior iterations are assigned a guaranteed match of Opt(bi) from which they are 
guaranteed not to be kicked out. The above paragraph argued the validity for the first 
iteration. Now it remains to be proven that this assumption holds also after the current 
iteration. 
 
Will any of the boys b in the current iteration have an interest in some girl gi which was 
offered to some boy bi at the current or any prior iteration? Clearly not for the girls g of 
the current iteration since the boys they were offered to were never challenged (by b in 
particular) at that girl – so clearly b prefers his match g to any of them. For prior 
iterations again we can show inductively that at each step, b became coupled by Gale-
Shapely in line 4 with a better partner from his perspective than any of the eliminated 
girls. Furthermore, note (also inductively) that the quality of a potential Gale-Shapely 
partner determined by line 4 for boy b can only improve (or stay the same) from one 
iteration to another. This follows from the fact that (i) all girls eliminated in line 6 are 
irrelevant to the remaining boys (induction hypothesis for prior iterations) and (ii) 
eliminating a boy can never degrade any outcome for a Gale-Shapely matching, which 
is what is produced in line 4 (boys and irrelevant girls are successively eliminated from 
the problem). Thus no boy b will care about any of the eliminated girls gi.  
Furthermore, as long as no one “bothers” any of the eliminated boys (by kicking them 
out of their offered matching), he can also safely ignore them. But none of the 
remaining boys can bother any of the eliminated ones. Why? Because (again 
inductively) for each boy b still not eliminated, the match produced in line 4 of the 
current iteration is the then-current Worse(b) for him. Thus, by Assumption 3.20 (no 
relative suicidal plays) his must first make a play at Worse(b) before going anywhere 
lower. But when he makes a play at Worse(b) (and of course all other players 
proposes to their Worse() first before going any lower) he will remain coupled with this 
girl since, by the very nature of Gale-Shapely all boys who would beat him at Worse(b) 
have a Worse() that is strictly better for them than Worse(b), thus will never “get to” 
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propose to her. Therefore, no remaining player b can under any (permissible) strategy 
profile set (of him and the other players) end up proposing lower than Worse(b). Thus 
no remaining boy would ever propose to a girl who is promised to some of the 
eliminated boys. 
 
By the two arguments above, we have that all remaining boys in the current round 
essentially do not care about any of the priory eliminated boys and girls. They can 
never intervene (given their promise also to play at their assigned promised partner 
first) in any strategy profile permissible under the assumptions and promise set of the 
game. 
 
Now, for the eliminated boys b, can any of them hope to form a coalition where they 
are strictly better off? Well, since all eliminated boys and girls do not count and can be 
ignored, notice that b is just a hopeless man of a Gale-Shapely round for the remaining 
boys. By the same arguments used in Lemma 3.14 (the hopeless men of a marriage 
problem instance), them ever getting a matching better than Worse(b) would imply 
some other remaining boy b1 gets a matching which is strictly worse than Worse(b1). 
But by Assumption 3.20 (no relative suicidal plays), b1 cannot support such a coalition 
(promise to play at his worse-than-Worse(b1) partner first). Since b1 cannot support 
the coalition, he will always first play to Worse(b1) before going any lower. But the 
moment b1 played at Worse(b1) it is guaranteed that the temperature of this girls is 
above b. 
Thus we have shown that also for the eliminated boys b of the current round, their 
promised partners g, are both Worse(b) and Opt(b). Are they guaranteed to keep these 
partners? Yes, because the induction will hold for all future iterations up until there are 
no more boys left, terminating the algorithm. 
 
Complexity analysis: 
The algorithm above consists of at most n iterations of Gale Shapley’s algorithm plus 
some O(1) work at each such iteration. The i-th iteration of Gale Shapely takes up to 
O((n-i)2)) plus some O(1) work. Therefore, the total running time is O( 12 + 1 + 22 + 1 + 
… + n2 + 1) = O(n3 + n) = O(n3). 
The space complexity is dominated by that of Gale-Shapely, namely O(n2). 
| 
The proof of correctness of the above algorithm proves Theorem 3.21. Since the 
algorithm makes no arbitrary choices in producing pairs of the end result, the final 
coalition stable matching thus produce is the unique one for the instance of the 
problem.  
 
Discussion: Note the crucial part played by Assumption 3.10 (generic cooperation and 
taking of sides): While it is true that the hopeless man b of each iteration is stuck with 
his partner g thus determined, with no hope of any feasible coalition ever improving his 
matching, he might however have veto power as to what coalitions are allowed to 
form from those which require his cooperation (him playing directly to Opt(b) without 
priory raising the temperature of some girls). So while he has no resolve in making his 
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own fate better (improving his matching), he might have the power to decide which 
coalitions are allowed to form and which not. Simply put, for a coalition he “likes” he will 
agree to support it by refraining from proposing to anyone but his final partner, but for 
all others he might refuse to endorse them and propose to some of his “higher-ups” 
first. In both situations the hopeless man will be no worse off, no better off, eventually 
ending up with his final partner. But in case his cooperation is required, he might simply 
choose to make someone else’s faith better off to the detriment of yet another’s fate 
which will be worse off. This kind of preferences are directly excluded by Assumption 
3.10: men are assumed to be fully indifferent with regard to what their fellow men’s 
outcomes are, thus allowing the remaining set to “play out” the game as if they (and 
their partner) were never part of it. This interesting special case of speculating this veto 
power will be analyzed in a different section.  
 
Here’s an example of running the Algorithm 3.22 for Example 3.1. 
 
Example 3.23 
 
Iteration 1: 
Round b1: b1g1. 
Round b2: b2g2. 
Round b3: b3g5. 
Round b4: b4g3. 
Round b5: b5g3|b4g2|b2g3|b5g5|b3g3|b2g5|b5g4. 
Round b6: b6g3(b3)|b6g6. 
Round b7: b7g2(b4)|b7g6(b6);b7g5|b2g7. 
 
The final (unchallenged) propositions are by b2 to g7 , b5 to g4 and (the 
irrelevant) b1 to g1. Notice that b6 is not in this set because he is challenged by 
b7 at g6 and wins. Thus we have Result = {b1-g1; b2-g7; b5-g4}. 
 
Iteration 1: 
 
 
Round b3: b3g5. 
Round b4: b4g3. 
Round b5: b5g3|b4g2  
Round b6: b6g3|b5g5|b3g3|b6g6. 
Round b7: b7g2(b4)|b7g6(b6);b7g5|b5g4. 
 
 
Iteration 2:  
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Round b3: b3g5. 
Round b4: b4g3. 
 
Round b6: b6g3|b4g2. 
Round b7: b7g2(b4)|b7g6. 
 
The final (unchallenged) propositions are by b4 to g2 , b7 to g6 and b3 to g5. 
Thus we have Result = {b1-g1; b2-g7; b5-g4} U {b3-g5; b4-g2; b7-g6}. 
 
Iteration 3:  
 
 
 
 
 
Round b6: b6g3. 
 
The final (unchallenged) proposition is by b6 to g3. Thus we have Result = {b1-
g1; b2-g7; b5-g4} U {b3-g5; b4-g2; b7-g6} U {b6-g3}. 
 
 
Iteration 4: 
<there are no more boys remaining> 
Thus the final Result = {b1-g1; b2-g7; b3-g5; b4-g2; b5-g4; b6-g3; b7-g6}, which 
interestingly enough is the second (latter) coalition discussed for Example 3.1. 
 
| 
 
The method Huang described in [10 - Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable 
Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung Huang, 2006], which reduces to a single application 
of Gale-Shapely followed by a single run of the top-trading-cycles implementation in [11 
- Pareto Optimality in House Allocation Problems, David J. Abraham, Katarína 
Cechlárová, David F. Manlove, Kurt Mehlhorn, 2005] takes O(n2) time. However, we 
claim that our Algorithm 3.22, whilst running in O(n3) produces a better quality 
matching in terms of stability: The discussion in Example 3.1 clearly shows a situation 
when the matching proposed by Huang’s method is not acceptable to some of the 
required supporters who can, “all things equal” get a strictly better one (excluding 
relative suicidal play) or in any case either a better or a no worse one by refusing to 
support the ensuing former (first) coalition discussed, which is the one Huang’s method 
produces. 
 
Note that if Assumption 3.20 (no relative suicidal plays) were to be dropped, a player 
could gain an advantage in Algorithm 3.22 by submitting a falsified preference list.  
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Example 3.24 (lies of b2) 
 
Say the preference lists are as follows. 
 
Preference of boys, in descending order (only relevant ones): 
Pb0 g4, g0 
Pb1 g4, g5 
Pb2 g1, g3, g4 
Pb3 g1, g2, g3 
Pb4 g2, g1 
Pb5 g5, g2, g4, g1 
 
Preference of girls, in descending order (only relevant ones): 
Pg0 - 
Pg1 b4, b5, b3, b2 
Pg2 b3, b4, b5 
Pg3 - 
Pg4 b2, b5, b0, b1 
Pg5 b1, b5 
 
Assume the players b2 submitted falsified preference list, switching the order of the 
bolded preferences. Consider the iterations of Algorithm 3.22. 
 
Iteration 1: 
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
Round b2: b2g1. 
Round b3: b3g1|b2g4|b0g0. 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5:  
b5g5(b1)|b5g2(b4)|b5g4(b2)|b5g1|b3g2|b4g1|b3g3. 
 
The hopeless men are b3 and b0. They remain coupled with g3 and g0 
respectively. 
 
Iteration 2: 
 
 
Round b1: b1g4. 
Round b2: b2g1. 
 
Copyright (c) Mircea Digulescu 
- 29 - 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: b5g5. 
 
All men are hopeless and get their respective partners. 
 
Iteration 3: 
<there are no more boys remaining> 
Thus the final Result = {b0-g0; b1-g4; b2-g1; b3-g3; b4-g2; b5-g5;}, where the 
strategic player b2 gets his first preference. 
 
Now consider the iterations of Algorithm 3.22 under the unfalsified preference list. 
 
Iteration 1: 
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
Round b2: b2g1. 
Round b3: b3g1|b2g3. 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: b5g5(b1)|b5g2(b4)|b5g4|b0g0. 
 
The hopeless men are b0 and b2. They remain coupled with g0 and g3 
respectively. 
 
Iteration 2:  
 
Round b1: b1g4. 
 
Round b3: b3g1 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: b5g5. 
 
The hopeless men are b1, b3, b4 and b5. They remain coupled with g4, g1, g2 
and g5 respectively. 
 
Iteration 3: 
<there are no more boys remaining> 
Thus the final Result = {b0-g0; b1-g4; b2-g3; b3-g1; b4-g2; b5-g5;}. Notice how in 
this matching b2 would get his mere 2nd preference g3, instead of g1. 
| 
Discussion: The actions of player b2 are prohibited under Assumption 3.20 (no relative 
suicidal plays). However, in case the other boys are not aware of his true preferences, 
he might get away with it, thus hinting that Algorithm 3.22 might not be suitable for 
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such cases. Note also, that once b2 played to g4, b5 could play directly to g3 in his 
round, in which case b2 would be a second iteration hopeless man with girl g4. 
 
Is there any way can we improve upon the running time of Algorithm 3.22? While 
intuitively it should be possible, several ideas, like trying to just “update” the Gale-
Shapely run from one iteration to another, instead of running from scratch do not lead, 
after some thought to any faster algorithm. If we will stumble upon a solution on how to 
compute the matching of Algorithm 3.22 faster, we will publish it in a new paper. 
 
Before we conclude this section, let us introduce a few more definitions and 
observations which, while not used here directly might prove to be useful for future 
reference. 
 
Consider a run of Gale-Shapley’s algorithm (for example Iteration 1 in Example 3.23 
above). Notice that it consists of n plays, one for each boy. Each play has an individual 
element of the form …|bxgy|… . We will assign to each of these elements a unique 
numeric ID during the first run of Gale-Shapely. 
 
Like, for example: 
Example 3.25 
 
Iteration 1: 
Round b1: b1g1(1). 
Round b2: b2g2(2). 
Round b3: b3g5(3). 
Round b4: b4g3(4). 
Round b5: b5g3(5) | b4g2(6) | b2g3(7) | b5g5(8) | b3g3(9) | 
b2g5(10) | b5g4(11). 
Round b6: b6g3(12)|b6g6(13). 
Round b7: b7g2(14)|b7g6(b6)(15);b7g5(16)|b2g7(17). 
| 
 
Now we will introduce some new concepts for each individual element.  
 
Definition 3.26 (information about elements) 
 
Notice that the existence of an element …|bxgy|… implies that bx first proposed to 
some better preferred girl in his preference list, let’s call her gv-1, but was eventually 
kicked out from or refused by gv (again, we are running Gale-Shapely here so proposal 
are made as if from naïve players). 
We call the prior element to element …|bxgy|… the element …|bxgy-1|… . 
Since bx eventually departed from gv, it follows that, in the course of the execution of 
Gale Shapely, some other boy, by occupied gv-1 at the time bx was rejected from her 
(either having been there already or having just proposed). We call this element  
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…|bygy-1|… the direct parent of element of …|bxgy|… . Notice that we require the 
precise element which was still “fulfilled” at the moment of bx proposal to gv-1, not just 
any of the prior elements which would still beat bx at gv-1. Also we define the 
relationship Children of an element to be the set of elements for which that element is 
a direct parent. 
We also denote as the parent set of an element x the set of all elements which entail a 
proposal to the girl of PriorElement(x) and would beat the boy of x at that girl. 
We also introduce shorthand notations like x.Girl and x.Boy. 
We also call PriorGirl(x) for some element x, the girl PriorElement(x).Girl. Notice that 
the prior girl for an element never changes (since the prior element also never 
changes). 
 
We can refer to elements either by their full notation (like …|bxgy|…) or by the 
numeric ID we assigned earlier, which will be unique forever. 
| 
 
Example 3.27 
For Example 3.25, we have 
PriorElement(b5g5(8)) = b5g3(5). 
ParentSet (b5g5(8)) = { b2g3(7) ; b3g3(9); b6g3 (12); } 
Or, simply ParentSet(8) = {7, 9, 12}. 
Also, we have DirectParent(8) = 7, since then b5 was kicked from his better 
preference g3 in Gale-Shapely. 
Also, note how Children(9) = {10, 12}. 
| 
 
Observation 3.28 (hopeless men are part of an element with no childern) 
A boy b of a Gale-Shapely iteration is hopeless iff he is part to an element x such that 
ChildSet(x)=Empty_Set. 
Proof: Notice that an element x with no children consists of a proposal by x.Boy to girl 
x.Girl who was never challenged there by anyone who lost, not even the initial moment 
it was made (thus x.Girl was uncoupled at that time). Since x.Boy is part of the 
element, it follows x.Boy proposed to x.Girl and remained coupled with her, never to 
be challenged or kicked-out from there (since any subsequent or previous play would 
imply that whoever lost, made a new proposal in some element y to which x would be 
the direct parent). 
| 
Thus, to determine the hopeless men of a certain iteration of Gale-Shapely, it suffices 
to enumerate the elements which have an empty ChildSet. 
 
Notice that under the relationship DirectParent() the elements (proposals) of Gale-
Shapely form a directed tree. For convenience we can introduce some artificial root, 
say * such that even the first proposals of each boy will have a parent. 
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In the proof of correctness of Algorithm 3.22 we showed that the matching of each boy 
b in the remaining set can only improve from one iteration to another. Since under 
Gale-Shapely each boy plays naïve, this simply means that some boys will make fewer 
and fewer proposals, limiting themselves to top something preferences. Notice thus, 
that never will new proposals appear in a subsequent iteration of Gale-Shapely (after 
some boys got eliminated) compared to the previous ones. The order in which 
proposals are made (elements appear into play) could also differ, but the set will never 
increase. 
Also, remember that under Lemma 2.9 (if all players have static strategy profiles, the 
order in which they propose is irrelevant) we can disregard the order in which the same 
set of proposals are made, as long as no boy dumps his partner spontaneously.  
 
We now pay some thought to the idea of “updating” Gale-Shapley’s output under 
addition/removal of boys.  
Addition of some boy is pretty straight forward: we just compute his play based on the 
prior matching, adding all proposals which he directly or indirectly causes to the tree. 
How about removal of boys? Notice that as boys are eliminated some elements of the 
plays will simply need to be deleted. What happens to the remaining ones? Well, as 
some boys “move up” in their preference lists, some of those will also need to be 
deleted as they were solely caused (directly or indirectly) by some of the ones 
removed. 
 
Well, if an element ends up having no possible direct parent, it has no reson d’ete: no 
reason for being. It thus needs to be deleted also. We need to be careful though that 
even after some element remained temporarily parentless, there could be some other 
still “active” element which might very well begin to play the role of parent to that 
element (i.e. another valid proposal that would beat the respective boy at his prior 
element’s girl). Notice nevertheless that such a potential substitute parent should not 
come from the subtree of the freshly parentless node (since this would entail cyclic 
causality). 
 
One might ponder whether an algorithm could be envisioned to dynamically maintain 
the tree of proposals under deletion of proposal. However, notice that just removing a 
single proposal (a single element) can cause up to O(n) direct parent link changes: for 
example, this is the case when all n boys propose to the same girl initially and the 
proposal of the winner is then removed. Notice also that adding a new hopeless man 
can introduce up to O(n2) new elements in the Gale-Shapely play (which would need to 
be deleted when he is removed from the tree). 
 
Consider the following play, for future reference. 
 
Example 3.29 (inferno of boy b) 
Assume b1,b2,…,bn are matched to g1,g2,…,gn before b’s round. 
Then: 
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bg1|b1g2|b2…gn-1|bn-1g1|b 
bg2|b1g3|b2…gn-1|bn-2g1|bn-1g2|b 
bg3|b1g4|b2…gn-1|bn-3g1|bn-2g2|bn-1g3|b 
… 
bgn-1(b1)|bg. 
 
Notice that the play is non-contradictory: no boys proposes to the same girl twice and 
there exists a feasible preference list of the girls: namely it is the reverse order in which 
they receive proposals here. 
 
Notice that this play is O(n2) long and that, in the end, b is a hopeless man. 
 
We call this situation inferno of boy b (since it degrades the matching of all the other 
boys by n-2 ranks), before ending up proposing to some free girl anyway. 
| 
Discussion: Notice how tremendous a leverage b’s acceptance to play directly to his 
Gale-Shapely partner has. Him accepting this increases the quality of all the other 
boys’ outcome from second worst to best. 
 
We conclude this section here. Its main result is Algorithm 3.22. 
 
4. INTRODUCING THREAT-POINTS AND DYNAMIC STRATEGIES 
 
In Section 3 we made the explicit Assumption 3.20 (no relative suicidal plays) and 
Assumption 3.9 (no suicidal plays permitted). Making them initially steamed from the 
idea that no boy is willing to risk getting a worse outcome just to take revenge on or 
punish some other boy. However, if he would consider taking such potentially self-
harmful action, he might be able to just use them as threats. As long as they do not 
materialize, they are not self-harmful, but, on the contrary, if they produce the desired 
effect they are beneficial for the one making them. 
 
A realistic case for the situation is that when for example a boy is essentially indifferent 
among his bottom 90% of the preference list. Thus, as long as he doesn’t get a “good” 
match he doesn’t care who he ends up being coupled with. As such, he might very well 
exploit this indifference by threatening other players (this time at no real potential cost 
to him) that he will cause them to get worse outcomes than they would if they 
cooperate with him. This variant of the problem where the preference lists of boys are 
not strict, but allow indifference, present further complexities and needs to be analyzed 
separately. However, such a situation could serve as a motivation for a player to 
engage in blackmail.  
 
But can engaging in blackmail produce better results for a player? We provide an 
answer by example to this question in the current section. 
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Thus we ponder what happens when Assumptions 3.20 and 3.9 are dropped and 
players are allowed to use threats to determine other players to cooperate with them 
(i.e. “join their coalition”).  
 
Definition 4.1 (ultimative choice) 
We say that a girl Ult(b) is such that b is satisfied to get Ult(b) or any girl ranking higher 
on his preference list, but he is unsatisfied to get anything below her. 
| 
Discussion: One should not view Ult(b) as b being indifferent among his top 
preferences up until Ult(b). He might have a strict preference for getting a girl as good 
as possible. However, if he eventually ends up with Ult(b) or better he is called 
satisfied. 
 
Interesting variations arise here as well: does he keep his ultimative preference secret 
or not? If he does, what does he actually demand of the other players? 
Another interesting variation concerns how hard he is willing to hurt himself in order to 
punish non-cooperators? If he doesn’t get his ultimative preference, but could get his 
next preferred one instead, will he reject this option and hurt himself “all the way” in 
order to get revenge? How “down” is he willing to go?  
 
Definition 4.2 (bottom choice) 
We say that a girl Bottom(b) is such that a boy b has a strict preference for getting 
Bottom(b) or better, rather than getting anything below her. 
Namely, he will take whatever strategy so long as it does not land him below Bottom(b) 
in the end. 
| 
Discussion: Bottom(b) essentially tells how much b is willing to hurt himself in case he 
doesn’t get his ultimative preference. Also, since we dropped Assumption 3.20 (no 
relative suicidal plays) and Assumption 3.9 (no suicidal plays permitted), b might 
actually play to girls lower than Bottom(b), so long as he eventually ends up Bottom(b) 
or better. Notice however that engaging in such play can be dangerous: the moment a 
boy plays successfully to some girl, under Assumption 2.3 (no dumping by the boys) he 
might as well end up stuck with her. In fact, the freshly kicked-out player has the option 
of playing to a particular uncoupled girl, in which case b might remain stuck for good. 
 
An interesting case is what would b’s motivation be if he doesn’t get even Bottom(b). 
What will he pursue then? Utter revenge, “minimize damage” by getting as good a girl 
as possible under the harsh circumstances, or some mid-way in again punishing some 
boys but not to the point of hurting himself too much, thus down until some Bottom’(b) 
(then if that fails, down until some Bottom’’(b) and so on)? Any of these is a valid option 
– a valid typology of player. Clearly, it is in b’s interest to keep his true Bottom(b) 
value(s) secret – this way he can always claim it’s the worst possible and thus be able 
to threaten other players even more. 
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One further aspect is what happens to the threats b makes? In case he doesn’t get 
Ult(b) will he actually play out his threats, hurting himself and others? Or will he just 
settle that his ultimatum was rejected and get the best he can, given that? Clearly, in 
real life “bluffs” could happen. And sometimes threats could be misread as bluffs and 
then produce astonishment when they are in fact materialized. 
 
We keep however, the meaning of Definition 3.10 (promises) in that once made, a 
promise is binding. The player does not have the option of breaking it. Remember that 
we defined only promises to refrain from playing at some girls, as long as some 
condition was met. We extend this now. 
 
Definition 4.3 (complex promises) 
A complex promise P(b, T) = S is a promise that if condition T is ever met, b will limit 
himself to playing exclusively a strategy from the set S={strategy_profile} and none 
other. We call condition T the trigger condition. 
Again, we require that promises are binding. Thus, also, as long as there is an 
outstanding promise P1 with a potentially still satisfiable trigger condition T1, a player b 
cannot make another promise P2 for some other trigger T2, such that both T1 and T2 
are satisfiable simultaneously and the intersection of the strategy profile sets S1 and 
S2 is empty. 
For convenience we allow the definition of set S to be by specifying some set 
membership function SC, such that SC(strategy_profile_x)=true iff strategy_profile_x is 
in the set S. 
| 
 
Under section 3, we had a clear and simple meaning of what a strategy profile was. It 
was, under Assumption 2.8 (all players have static strategy profiles) a static strategy 
profile. Now it might be useful to drop this assumption too, in order to allow players to 
choose whom they want to punish, gradually as the real-life (i.e. not any simulation) 
game is played out (and thus the temperature of some girls is irreversibly raised). We 
might allow this or not. If the players have to, after negotiating among themselves, 
submit a static strategy profile to some central authority who then (perhaps assuming 
they are the boy’s true preference list) simulates the execution of the strategy and 
produces the final outcome, then Assumption 2.8 will hold. 
Warning: Notice that, given the possibility of strategic play, some central authorities 
might impose that they automatically provide the coalition-stable matching, or the top-
trading-cycles Pareto efficient matching (under the method described in [10 - Cheating 
by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung Huang, 2006]) 
arguing that it will not make any of the remaining boys worse off than in Gale-Shapely. 
Strategic play would then imply submitting a static strategy profile that provides the 
desired outcome under this new, non-Gale-Shapely algorithm. However, we are 
concerned with how the marriage game would play out in “real-life”, with boys 
proposing to girls under some termination rules, not to the variant where the strategies 
of propositions prescribed by the boys are no longer respected (as is potentially the 
case with a non-Gale-Shapely authority). 
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In order to accommodate a sufficient variety of complex promises, we allow boys to 
have dynamic strategies. That is, they choose “at each moment of choice” (when they 
are uncoupled), to what girl they propose next. However, we impose that players to 
make choices exclusively based on the gameplay, not on other factors such as 
weather it rained outside or whether they are in a good mood. We can however allow 
that players introduce randomness in their decision making. 
 
Definition 4.4 (dynamic pure strategy profiles) 
A dynamic pure strategy profile of some boy b is a function  
s(b) : Game_State  G, associating for each possible state of the game at that 
moment a girl to whom b will propose next.  
A Game_State consists of all prior plays all boys made, in the order in which they were 
made, as well as their outcomes (accepted/rejected). Under Assumption 2.1 (girls are 
robotic players), the outcomes need not be explicitly specified, as they can be deduced 
uniquely. 
| 
Discussion: Notice that definition 4.4 excluded the possibility of players deciding 
probabilistically. 
 
For the moment, we limit our attention exclusively to pure strategies (no random 
events). But we also define mixed strategies for future reference. 
 
Definition 4.5 (dynamic mixed strategy profiles) 
A dynamic mixed strategy profile of some boy b is a function  
s(b) : Game_State  Distrib(G), associating for each possible state of the game at that 
moment a probability distribution over set G of girls, representing the probability with 
which boy b will propose to that given girl. The actual proposal will then be determined 
at random according to this distribution. 
The Game_State information is the same as that of Definition 4.4. Notice that players 
also have access to prior randomness pertaining to their own choices (since they learn 
which girl they proposed to actually) and even pertaining to the other players’ choices, 
if their dynamic mixed strategy profiles are known. 
| 
Discussion: Notice that definition 4.5 allowed players to decided randomly at each 
moment, considering fresh information. This model however is NOT more powerful 
than if players simply choose a probability distribution over a set of dynamic pure 
strategy profiles. It is however more powerful than choosing a distribution over a set of 
static strategy profiles. 
Divagation: If we were to be extremely exigent, we might allow a player to have access 
to some pool of random numbers and use them anyway he chooses. That way 
randomness later in the game could be more or less entangled with randomness 
earlier in the game. But since this complication produces no apparent benefit for the 
model, we only mention it for philosophical consideration at the moment. Interesting, if 
maybe absurd cases can be considered if, for example, two players somehow share a 
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source of randomness.  
 
Let us now formalize the game model. 
 
Dynamic Game Model 4.6 
Assume the gameplay is modeled as follows. 
A game consists of the following steps, as long as there exists at least one uncoupled 
boy: 
1. We ask that each uncoupled boy b submit his next proposal under his 
dynamic (pure or mixed) strategy profile, given the current game state. He 
does not know what other boys decided at the current step. 
2. Each girl g who received new proposals picks out the most preferred one 
among that set plus the partner (if any) she already had, forming a 
temporary couple. 
3. The information about what happened in steps 1-2 is provided to all boys. 
4. If there are no more uncoupled boys, the game terminates. 
 
The matching which remained after all steps are completed is the final result. 
| 
Discussion: Notice that we require that all uncoupled boys propose simultaneously. 
That is none of them has the (potential) advantage of knowing what others proposed in 
that step. He will know only what proposals were made before that step. 
 
Since we allow no “act of consciousness” to interfere in the decision process of a 
player – i.e. that he decides solely based on the Game_State, not any personal mood 
or “gut feeling”, Definition 4.5 suffices to model the case where any set of complex 
promises are made beforehand (before beginning of gameplay). In fact, for each 
feasible Game_State the game might reach, each boy (uncoupled in that situation) will 
have to produce a next proposal. Allowing him to decide at that moment is the same as 
asking him to state before-hand what he would do in that situation. Since there can be 
terribly many Game_States (as we shall discuss) we usually do not require an 
individual move for each possible Game_State individually, but allow some 
Game_States to be grouped, producing the same choice (e.g. a naïve strategy can be 
stated as “for all situations where the boy in question has already proposed to the top x 
girls in his order of preference, his next proposal is to girl x+1”). 
 
The first question we ask is: Can engaging in threat-making help a boy out? It would 
seem the answer is a big yes. But first, let’s adjust our notation to handle the Dynamic 
Game Model 4.6. 
 
Notation 4.7 (plays with concurrency) 
We extend Notation 2.11 (play) to handle the new Dynamic Game Model 4.6, where 
several proposals take place simultaneously and all uncoupled boys have to propose 
at once. We introduce a small grammar for the play. 
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We say that a play P can be a “conventional” play, under Notation 2.11 (play) with the 
meaning there stated. 
 
We say that a play P can be P = P1; P2; P3; …; Pn, with the meaning that it consists of 
the plays P1, P2, …, Pn which started at the same initial moment (the start time index 
of play P). The initial time index for the “root” play is 0. 
 
We introduce the notation bPx, where b is a boy and Px is a play having the first 
element include a proposal by boy b, as short-hand notation for representing the 
entirety of play Px. So instead of explicitly writing the contents of Px there, we just 
reference it like this. 
 
Also, we introduce the possibility of multiple boys proposing at once, with the notation: 
Px = b1,b2,…,bk g(b1)| bP1, b2P2, …, bkPk, to signify that in proposal Px, 
boys b1,b2,…,bk proposed to girl g, who chose b1 (dumping her former partner b), 
and then the uncoupled boys b, b2,…,bk continued to propose as described in plays 
P1, P2,…,Pk. 
Sometimes, we include the time index of the beginning of a play in parenthesis, for 
clarity. 
 
Here’s an example of using the notation: 
 
P(0) = P1; P2; 
P1(0) = b1,b2 g1(b1)|b2P3; 
P2(0) = b3g2. 
P3(1) = b2g2|b3g1|b1P4 
P4(3) = b1g3. 
 
The root descriptor of the play is P. 
| 
 
In this section we will use examples without stating explicitly the preference lists of 
boys and girls (since they may be long), but rather require that they are compatible 
with some plays we present (under Notation 2.11 (play) or Notation 4.8 (plays with 
concurrency)). We make the following Observation. 
 
Observation 4.8 (necessary and sufficient condition for plausibility of plays) 
A play is plausible (there exists at least one set of preference lists by the girls which 
allows it) iff no boy proposes twice to the same girl. 
A possible preference list of some girl is the reverse order in which she received the 
proposals she accepted, with all rejected proposals following down at the end of her 
list. 
| 
Discussion: Notice that the observation holds even for sets of plays under Notation 4.8. 
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Now consider the following example: 
 
Example 4.9 (devilish alliance) 
Let a play T consist of the following plays P0 (starting at time index 0), P1 
(starting at time index 0), P2 (starting at time index 1), P3 (starting at time index 
2), and P4 (starting at time index 14): 
T (0) = P0; P1. 
P0 (0) = b2g2; b3g3; b5g5; b6g6; b7g7; b8g8; b10g4. 
P1 (0) = b1,b4,b9g1(b1)|b9P2; b4P3; 
P2 (1) = b9g9; 
P3 (2) = b4g2|b2g1|b1g3|b3g9(b9)|b3g2|b4… 
        b4g5|b5g3|b1g6|b6g5|b4… 
        b4g7|b7g6|b1g8|b8g7|b4P4. 
P4 (14) = b4g4|b10g9|b9g10. 
 
Let’s assign a preference list to boys such that all players except b4 and b9 are 
naïve players in this play P. In case of b4, his true second preference is g10. In 
case of b9 say his true first preference is g10 and his true second preference is 
g9. Assume b4 beats b9 at g10. 
 
So what happened in the play?  
 
In P0, all boys proposed to their first choices and were accepted. 
In P1, b9 did not propose to his first preference, g10, but instead to g1, where 
he was refused. He did this knowing he would be refused so that he could 
observe what b1’s play at that time index was. 
In P2, b9 still didn’t play to his first preference (g10) but instead plays to g9. He 
did this to appease b4 who seeks revenge on b1 and in turn offers g9 to b9. 
Also, in P1, b1 ousted b4 from g1. However, in P3, b4, by not playing at his true 
2nd preference (g10), took triple revenge on b1, causing him to be ousted from 
not only g1 but also from his next two choices (g3 and g6), before moving on. 
Furthermore, he made a lot of other players (b2,b3,b5,b6,b7,b8) worse off. 
In P4, b4 again played to a less preferred choice, g4, causing some small 
havoc for b10, but improving b9’s outcome to his first preference. 
 
We call play T a threat by boy b. 
 
Why would such a strange play arise? Simply put: b4 makes a tempting promise 
to b9 that if his instructions are followed to the letter, b9 will always end up 
coupled with his first choice, g10. Since b4 beats b9 at g10, b9 can only hope 
to get g10 (b4’s second choice) if b4 gets his first choice, OR if b4 promises to 
let b9 have her even if he doesn’t end up with his first choice. 
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Now say that b4 makes b9 the proposal to make the binding offer to play 
according to play T, so long as b9 promises to cooperate. b4 could then 
instruct b9 to play like this: “For the first round, play to some girl where you 
would lose for sure [under the assumptions of plausibility of play P, any girl 
except g9 and b10 might do], like g1. For the second round, if b1 played to g3, 
play to g10 directly. Otherwise, play to girl g9.” Say player b9 agrees and both 
player b4 and b9 makes such their promises (which are not just “to each other”, 
but binding). 
 
Now say b4 makes the following bitter-sweet threat to b1: “If you oust me from 
g1, I will exercise triple revenge of b4, playing threat T and you will get your 4th 
choice, g8. If you leave g1 to me, I will promise you to get g3, your 2nd choice. 
You need to play directly to g3.” 
If b1 knows about b9’s and b4’s already made, binding, promises, he can see 
that b4’s threat-promise is genuine. Say that b1 accepts, making a binding 
promise to play to g3 first. 
 
What happens then? Consider the play Q. 
Q (0) = Q0; Q1; Q2. 
Q0 (0) = b2g2;b5g5;b6g6;b7g7;b8g8;b10g4; 
Q1 (0) = b4,b9g1(b4)|b9Q3. 
Q2 (0) = b1,b3g3(b1)|b3Q4. 
Q3 (1) = b9g10. 
Q4 (1) = b3g9. 
 
How do things look now? Everybody gets his first choice, except b3 and b1 who 
gets both get their 2nd choices, b3 up from his 3rd choice and b1 up from his 4th 
choice, compared to the play under threat T. 
 
We call play Q the cooperation alternative to play T. 
 
So everybody should be happy right? b2, b3, b5, b6, b7, b8 and b10 (who were 
not even required to cooperate beyond a naïve strategy) got better 
outcomes, b9 got same better than Gale-Shapely (ideal in this case) outcome 
and even b1 got significantly better. 
 
So what is the catch? Consider what plays would have occurred had all 
players been naïve (thus resulting in the Gale-Shapely matching). Of course, 
naïve over their true preference lists, with no forging. 
 
Consider play G which would occur under Gale-Shapely. 
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G (0) = G0; G1; 
G0 (0) = b2g2;b3g3;b5g5;b6g6;b7g7;b8g8;b9g10;b10g4. 
G1 (0) = b1,b4g3(b1)|b4G2 
G2 (1) = b4g10|b9g9. 
 
So in the naïve strategy case, b4 would get his second choice, b9 also his 
second choice and all the rest (including b3 and b1) their first choice. 
 
Even applying the coalition stable matching defined under the Assumptions of 
Section 3, Algorithm 3.22 would produce the same matching. 
 
However, b4 and b9 colluding to produce the hell threat T, managed to get 
better outcomes for them both, by employing suicidal and relatively suicidal 
plays. Notice however, that if we were to modify threat play T just by changing 
P4 to: 
P4 (14) = b4g10. 
Then players b4 and b9 would both get their Gale-Shapely under threat T (in 
case b1 refuses to cooperate but b3 – assuming he could – doesn’t exercise 
some revenge of his own). So they would both be no worse off than in either a 
stable matching or a coalition stable matching under assumptions of Section 3. 
And, on the other hand, if their threat T holds, then they get the ideal outcome. 
Why on earth would they not exercise this devilish option? 
| 
Discussion: We can see how eliminating Assumptions 3.9 (no suicidal plays permitted) 
and 3.20 (no relative suicidal plays) can dramatically change the prospects for a 
coalition outcome for some boys – improving them for some, drastically curtailing them 
for others. Is there any catch? Well, the sole catch so far is the reason we made 
Assumptions 3.9 and 3.20 – the boys might end up worse off than in Gale-Shapely (or 
in the coalition stable matching of Algorithm 3.22). The above example was chosen 
deliberately to allow several plausible preference list of the girls, some allowing say a 
vengeful b3 to exercise a revenge of his own in case of threat T, throwing b4 and/or b9 
off from their Gale-Shapely partner, but also some where b4 and b9 have absolutely 
nothing to lose by committing themselves to threat T.  
 
As powerful as Example 4.9 is (we may pause for a bit to allow its significance to sink 
in), notice that it necessarily involved a dynamic strategy profile on part of boy b9: he 
decides his second move based on what b1 did. 
 
Observation 4.10 
One question that quickly arises with Example 4.9 is “but couldn’t the other boys 
except b4 and b9 improve at least some of their outcomes by playing somehow 
differently than the naïve strategy? Say knowing that b4 and b9 will play the way they 
do?” The short answer is no, they couldn’t. Thus, if b4 and b9’s plays are fixed (in 
Copyright (c) Mircea Digulescu 
- 42 - 
terms of a dynamic pure strategy profile), the other players have no means to 
cooperate to make at least some of them better off without making others (whose 
cooperation is needed) worse.  
 
Proof: Under threat T, all of b2,b5,b6,b7,b8,b10 all get their second preference, 
making just two proposals: one to their respective first preference and one to their 
second preference. Furthermore, all get kicked out from their first preference as part of 
a play triggered by a proposal of b4. No one on that play would have an interest (in 
terms of selfish outcome) to play differently since, having already been kicked out from 
his first choice, the best one could do is the second choice. In case of b3, he also gets 
kicked out from his second choice by b9, which is also part of the devilish alliance. So 
again in case of b3 the best he could do is getting his third choice, which he does. 
| 
 
One question we ask is how to develop the best possible strategy for a player b such 
that, given how he and other players would behave, gives b the best possible outcome. 
It would be great if b could announce some ultimative strategy, computable based just 
on the true preference lists of the problem instance such that given the motivations of 
the other players, he is certain that he will get the best possible outcome for himself 
(potentially relying on the fact other players will be able to compute this strategy for b 
without b needing to announce it, and thus they will adapt given this situation). This 
problem is far more intellectually challenging than the static strategy profile case with 
no suicidal play discussed in Section 3. An efficient algorithm to solve it is yet to be 
developed. 
 
Since any potential benefit from a threat-making strategy is gained only when some 
parties succumb to the extortion (perhaps considering they are better off giving up a 
few ranks than “upsetting the madman” and ending up with a much worse outcome), 
and alter their own strategies as a result. Some players on the other hand might find 
utility in refusing any extortion, even if this would harm their ultimate outcome. Yet 
others might even try to take revenge (within the game we mean) on a threat-making 
strategic player. 
 
Notice that this is potentially a game of Ultimatum (see 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game) for a brief statement). As such, if some 
boy b fixes his strategy profile (for example by making a promise to play that profile), 
then the other players, who haven’t yet committed to a strategy profile, would have no 
option than to consider b a robotic player for his announced strategy and adapt. Thus, 
it could be the case that those who “rip off the wheal” first (announce their threat 
strategy first) can force all other rational players to simply give in to the ultimatum or 
hurt themselves for sure. Since we concern ourselves with the stable marriage problem 
and not poker psychology, we will still maintain the requirement that all promises are 
binding. Thus, a bluff is excluded once a promise is made. 
To alleviate the problem of the advantage gained by committing to an Ultimatum first, 
we allow players to make promises simultaneously. Thus, we augment the Dynamic 
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Game Model 4.6 to allow any player to make a promise (or a set of promises) at any 
time during the play, including before the first iteration. Such promises are known to all 
others, should they wish to consult them. Promise making is considered instantaneous 
and is permitted to delay the game play (thus we are not troubled by the possibility of 
some player “filibustering” the game by making an infinite sequence of promises 
without advancing to a proposal). 
 
We now pay a little attention to what the game play actually consists of, under model 
Dynamic Game Model 4.6. 
 
Definition 4.11 (elementary position) 
We call a vector V = <bi1 or nill, bi2 or nill, …, bin or nill> an elementary position in the 
game, corresponding to each girl in order g1, g2, …, gn being coupled with the boy 
specified by the respective position in the vector (or remain uncoupled if that position is 
nill). 
It follows immediately that all boys which are not in vector V are uncoupled. 
We call an elementary position terminal if the associated V vector contains no nills. 
| 
Discussion: Vector V actually describes the temperature of the girls in play. 
 
Notice that the initial game elementary position is V = <nill, nill, …, nill>. Also notice 
that a “move” at Step 1 of any iteration of the Dynamic Game Model 4.6 corresponds to 
the selection of one of the (at most) n remaining girls a boy hasn’t proposed to, for 
each boy. Such a move would then result, after Step 2 of that iteration, in a new 
elementary position. We require by convention that boys refrain from proposing to girls 
who would obviously refuse them, already having a temperature above them. 
 
Observation 4.12 (Number of terminal positions) 
There are n! terminal positions.  
Proof: Since a boy cannot end up coupled with two girls, and all boys are coupled, the 
resulting terminal vector V must be a permutation of the boys (as we assumed without 
loss of generality an equal number of boys and girls). 
| 
 
Observation 4.13 (Total number elementary positions) 
There are can be no more than (n+1)n elementary positions in total.  
Proof: The maximal bound follows immediately from the definition of the position 
vector. Each element in the n element vector V can have at most n+1 distinct values (n 
boys plus nill). 
| 
 
Observation 4.14 (The game graph is a DAG) 
The game graph is a directed acyclic graph with one root node and n! terminal nodes. 
We consider that edges are labeled with one element from the potential moves by all 
uncoupled boys at that particular position. The moves are not directly restricted by prior 
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gameplay other than the then-current elementary position of the game. 
Proof: Each time a move is made in the game, the temperature of at least some girl g 
increases (potentially from nill), since we exclude futile proposals by boys. The 
incoming edges for an elementary position (except the root one) are from a position 
where g had a lower temperature. Thus, for a cycle to complete, one of those positions 
would have to be reached again. However, by Observation 2.6 (non-decreasing 
temperature of girls), still valid under Dynamic Game Model 4.6, girl g’s temperature 
cannot decrease throughout the remainder of the game. Thus, none of the position’s 
source (inbound) nodes will be reachable. Thus no cycle is possible. 
| 
Discussion: A gameplay is actually a path in this DAG from the root node 
(V=<nill,nill,…,nill>) to some terminal node. However, note that under Dynamic Game 
Model 4.6, a player is allowed to decide based not just on the current elementary 
position (temperatures of girls) but also on the history of the game. Thus, to be 
complete, a position in the game would consist of an elementary position PLUS the 
path the game took to reach it (the edges, in order). 
 
Definition 4.15 (Game_State) 
We say that a that a Game_State S is a pair <V, H>, where V is an elementary position 
and H is an ordered list of edges which were followed for the game to progress from 
the initial elementary position <nill,nill,…,nill> to elementary position V. 
| 
 
Observation 4.16 (Size of history) 
The maximal size of the history H of some Game_State S is n2 ordered proposals. 
Proof: Note that the Game_State’s history is in fact a chronological arrangement of 
proposals, some of them grouped together at the same chronological time (thus 
forming an edge). Notice that for a given chronological list of proposals, it is immediate 
which proposals form an edge (since all uncoupled boys after the previous edge must 
propose in the current edge and none other than them). By Observation 2.6 (non-
decreasing temperature of girls) and Assumption 2.3 (no dumping by the boys), there 
can be at no more than n2 proposals in a game play (each girl receiving a proposal 
from each boy).  
| 
 
Observation 4.17 (Number of distinct histories) 
The worst case number of game histories for a problem instance is between (n-1)n and 
(n2)!. 
Proof: By the above argument it quickly follows there can be no more than (n2)! game 
histories (at most one for each permutation of the at most n2 proposals, with some 
permutations not representing a possible game play). Since each game history also 
uniquely determines the resulting elementary position, we can say there are no more 
than (n2)! Game_States. Under this estimate, for our Example 4.9, there could be more 
up to more than 10157 Game_States. But this maximum may not necessarily be 
reachable.  
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Consider Example 3.29 (inferno of boy b). Under the induced preference list of girls, 
each time a boy is uncoupled (up to n times), he might as well propose to any of the 
girls (except the last); the final outcome would be the same – he only shortens the 
game history a bit: with the number of “skipped” girls in his preference list (who may 
end up higher than him in temperature next time he is uncoupled) and the number of 
potential proposals by all boys ranking below him at that respective girl, who have not 
yet proposed. We can say that a boy can decide to shorten the history each time he 
proposes by a number between 0 and at most some value below 2n. Even if each boy 
was to decide initially that he would only once skip a number of proposals (between 0 
and n-2 for all boys except b whose range is between 0 and n-1), most combinations 
of such decision would result different histories (as players decide to skip, the 
remaining players may have their options to skip become more and more limited). 
There are (n/n-1)*(n-1)n possibilities. For 11 boys this value would be >1011. Still way 
too many. And this is just considering a single decision to “skip ahead”. In the situation 
of Example 3.29 (inferno of boy b), a boy could make successive decisions to “skip 
ahead” some of his proposals.  
| 
 
We can quickly note that solving the game by solving each potential Game_State is not 
feasible, even though such an approach can lead to an algorithm for the optimal 
solution, if one exists: Since the game graph is a DAG, one can color nodes, starting at 
the leaves (terminal nodes) based on weather that said node is a “winning”, “losing”, 
acceptable or inacceptable (below Bottom(b)) position for any player b. Save 
coordination issues, a player could then decide at each position for a branch that would 
leave him best-off. Since such an algorithm would run in super-exponential time, we do 
not proceed further in this direction. However, even though the number of 
Game_States makes solving the Game at each position unfeasible, we can still use 
this DAG modeling of the game to reason about how players strategize. 
 
An Ultimatum is useful only when it is accepted. One cannot develop an adequate 
model for developing an optimal strategy without knowing when ultimatums are 
accepted and when they are rejected. By definition of Bottom(b), we require that each 
player accepts an Ultimatum which would – when rejected – leave him bellow 
Bottom(b), but when accepted allow him to get Bottom(b) or better.  
Again, we have not clarified what happens when a boy gets below Bottom(b) [no 
matter what]: that is, given the strategies of the other players, he cannot possibly end 
up Bottom(b) or better. We allow his play to be arbitrary in that circumstance. In 
particular, the natural expectation is that he will try to get other boys below their 
Bottom() outcome, in the hopes of deterring them from the plays that got him (b) below 
Bottom(b). Note however, that perfectly valid problem instances exist where some 
players always end up below their Bottom() and they do not hold any direct veto power 
over the outcomes of some coalition, leaving them powerless. 
 
For the moment we concern ourselves with when b can get Bottom(b) or better. 
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Assumption 4.18 (implicit promises) 
If all potential feasible paths from a given Game_State down the game DAG end up in 
some terminal position where a boy b ends up worse than Bottom(b) we say that such 
a Game_State is losing for boy b. A path is feasible if given the promises and 
assumptions of the game model, all boys are permitted at all times to make the 
proposals resulting in that play path. 
 
Every boy b makes a mandatory initial promise that whenever he is in a non-losing 
Game_State he will never make a play that, given the promises and assumptions of 
the game model, would certainly lead to one of the losing Game_States for him.  
 
Note that the initial “wrong move” that b might ponder to make need not be the 
proposal part of the move immediately leading to the losing Game_State, but one 
further “above” it in the game DAG. 
 
Furthermore, we require that any player who ends up below his Bottom(b) will take 
such a strategy as to deter the prior play by some other boy or boys, which caused him 
to get below his Bottom(b), by also getting them below their Bottom(). Assuming, of 
course, such a play exists. 
| 
Discussion: Note that the above assumption is quite limitative. First of all, each boy b 
implicitly undertakes that he will NOT be willing to hurt himself below Bottom(b) in 
order to deter others from a particular game path (which might result in him getting far 
above Bottom(b)). This was, after all, the definition of Bottom(b). Secondly, player b 
might find himself in a losing Game_State at the beginning of the game – before the 
initial proposals. In such a situation we say the game instance is invalidated. Also note 
that this assumption implies a promise by b to refrain only from moves which are 
certainly losing for him. Since at any given iteration of the Dynamic Game Model 4.6 
several boys decide at once, if their decisions are not fixed by promises, a certain 
proposal by boy b might or might not lead to a losing position for him, depending on 
what the other boys simultaneously chose. Thus, under Dynamic Game Model 4.6, the 
marriage game is also a game of coordination. We call a game instance where the 
game play could result in such a situation, where a boy is faced with a situation where 
he may play resulting in a losing Game_State for him, as invalidateable.  
 
Note that an invalidateable game instance might no longer be invalidateable if the 
players other than b (from the above discussion) change their promise set so that, 
should the game reach that strange situation where b can make a play that may or 
may not be losing, they all play such that b’s play is losing. Also note that such a 
promise set may not always exist, since b might have more than one valid potential 
proposal which might lead or not to a losing Game_State for him and thus the other 
players may not know which one b actually makes (under a dynamic mixed strategy 
profile for example). b in turn might want to decide based on what the other boys 
actually play, hence a cyclic dependence. This is the key trait of a synchronization 
game. 
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We shall seek to avoid both invalidated and invalidateable game instances. 
  
Assumption 4.19 (further implicit promises) 
If all potential paths from a given Game_State down the game DAG end up in some 
terminal position where a boy b ends up worse than Ult(b) we say that such a 
Game_State is unsatisfactory for boy b. 
 
Every boy b makes a mandatory initial promise that, he will never make a move 
certainly leading to an unsatisfactory Game_State, so long as he has another move 
which certainly leads him to a satisfactory position – given the promises and 
assumptions of the game model.  
 
Note again that the initial “wrong move” that b might ponder to make need not be the 
proposal part of the move immediately leading to the unsatisfactory Game_State, but 
one further “above” it in the game DAG. 
| 
Discussion: Essentially unlike Assumption 4.17 where each boy promised never to 
make a play certainly leading him to a losing position, here we require that each boy 
promises never to play to certainly an unsatisfactory position, so long as he has a 
certain strategy to attain a satisfactory outcome. Note that this is much weaker than the 
former assumption (for Bottom(b)) since a boy is allowed to take strategies which 
would certainly lead him below Ult(b) if he has no guaranteed one leading him at or 
above. Furthermore, if he ends up below Ult(b), the game path does not get invalidated 
(as in the case of Assumption 4.17), but the promise no longer has any effect (and b 
can potentially take revenge including by hurting himself down until Bottom(b)). 
 
Note that both Assumption 4.17 and 4.18 together do necessarily limit the strategies 
available to any single player to just one.  
Since these assumptions imply promise making (and thus a potential limitations of 
gameplay), a totally “free” player would be inclined to choose Ult(b) as his first 
preference and Bottom(b) as his last preference. That way, he either gets his first 
choice, or he is free to play however. But if he cannot get his first preference no matter 
what, then what? Logic of self-interest would dictate he would lower Ult(b) to his 
second preference and see if he can attain that. But really? 
 
Definition 4.20 (augmented problem instance) 
We say that an augmented problem instance for the marriage problem includes, 
alongside the boys’ and girls’ preference lists, the Bottom(b) and Ult(b) specifications 
for all boys b. 
| 
Discussion: Notice that in real-life situations, only Bottom(b) may actually be “hard-
fixed” apriori. A player may be flexible with his Ult(b) choice. But then again maybe not. 
 
Example 4.21 (what a standoff) 
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Note that for Example 4.9 (devilish alliance), if both Ult(b4) = g1 and Ult(b1) = 
g1, then they cannot both get their sole ultimative choice. Furthermore, if any 
of them lowers his choice Ult() one notch (b4 to Ult(b4) = g10; or b1 to Ult(b1) = 
g3), then both options are feasible. Furthermore, they both get their second 
choice if they both lower it. So who should lower it then?... In Example 4.9, in 
case of non-cooperation b1 would get his 4th choice rather than his 2nd one if 
he cooperated (and b4 potentially say his 3rd at g4). But the preferences could 
be adjusted so that, in case of non-cooperation by b4 (if b1 is kicked out of g1), 
b1 might play to g4 (assume successfully) and b4 would then end by stuck with 
g2 (maybe his 4th or 5th or 6th choice – say his 5th choice). This is a typical 
standoff. Who will back off? b1 or b4? If neither of them backs off, then they 
both get worse outcomes (lose-lose situation). But it may very well happen! We 
call such a situation a standoff.  
 
In fact, this standoff situation is a distinct coordination game – an Ultimatum 
game called Game of Chicken (see  
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Chicken_(game) for a brief description). There is 
nothing in the data of even an augmented marriage problem instance which 
might determine how such a standoff is resolved, in the general case (for 
example in case for example both Bottom(b4) and Bottom(b1) are set to their 
respective last preference, in which case no player is forced by Assumption 
4.18 (implicit promises) to avoid that play).  
 
Another noteworthy aspect is that if dynamic mixed strategy profiles are 
allowed, the players might even agree to “flip the coin” over the decision to 
pursue g1 or not. Note how using a shared coin might help them synchronize 
(so they don’t both get to propose to g1), thus making the Divagation of 
Definition 4.5 (dynamic mixed strategy profiles) interesting. In this particular 
case (where they both propose to the same girl), if they trust each other, there 
is no mandatory need for a shared coin. However, in other cases such a device 
might prove useful (for example if they commit to one of two strategies by first 
proposing to some other girl g12 or g13 and g14 or g15 respectively), even if 
the players trust each other (in making a truly random choice). 
| 
 
Given the potential for standoffs, even an augmented problem instance may not have a 
definable optimum for some players. If the augmented problem instance contains 
standoffs, without being given some apriori method of resolving them (for example an 
ordering of the boys based on their willingness to back off in a stand-off), what one 
could hope for is to determine that there is a reachable standoff and leave it at that. 
Note however, that the mere existence of standoffs need to threaten the optimal 
outcome of some boys not directly or indirectly involved with the standoff. If Example 
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4.9 (devilish alliance) were to be augmented with some other boys and girls, with the 
newly added boys having girls g1-g10 as their worst preferences, they couldn’t care 
less how b4 and b1 decide their standoff – they would be unaffected (so long of course 
as none of the first boys can and decides to involve them with the cost of making 
himself yet even worse off). 
 
We note that in a non-augmented problem instance there can always be stand-offs: A 
player b who plays to g, below his Gale-Shapely outcome, can end up with that match 
if no other boy proposes to g. In fact, if the freshly kicked-out boy can propose to the 
girl who would end up uncoupled under a Gale-Shapely for the remaining set of 
players. That way, if no other players except b are threat-making, this player will not 
contribute to b being kicked out of g. Even if there are other threat-makers, if all 
blackmailed boys play according to this strategy, all threat-makers will end up worse-off 
then their Gale-Shapely. Thus, there is an inherent stand-off between any threat-
yielding player and the rest: if his ultimatum is rejected, he can be made to end up 
worse off than if he drops his threat strategy. 
 
Using a maximum matching algorithm, one can determine if an augmented problem 
instance admits a solution satisfactory to all players (when they all get above their 
Ult()). This can be verified using a bipartite matching algorithm: each boy can be 
matched with any of his Ult(b) or better preferences. The augmented problem instance 
admits a satisfactory outcome for all players iff there exists a perfect matching 
(matching all n boys). We refer to the Ford-Fulkerson method [14 - The Ford-Fulkerson 
method, TH Cormen, CE Leiserson, RL Rivest, C Stein, 2001] for solving maximum 
bipartite matching. Better methods may exist. Since the maximum size of the matching 
(and thus maximal flow in [14]) is n, and each boy has at most n preferences, the 
running time would be O(n * n2) = O (n3). 
Note however that such an approach only gives a hint as to what the outcome of 
optimal play may be. Under optimal play, it may well be that some players can get 
satisfactory outcomes no matter what the other players do. For Example 4.9 (devilish 
alliance), if Ult(b1)=g1, but all other players have no Ult() [formally their Ult() is their 
least preferred girl], even if b1 does not get g1 under the threat play, all the others get 
at or above their Ult(). In fact, the preferences of the girls in Example 4.9 could be 
tweaked so that the Ult() of all players except b1 and b4 are their actual outcomes 
under the threat play (their second preferences most of the time); this way even if b1 
gets unsatisfactory outcome, they still all get satisfactory ones.  
Furthermore, a problem instance can admit several solutions satisfactory to all players. 
Some in which some group is better off and other in which part of this group is worse 
off. So which one should be chosen? As with the case with the approach in [10 - 
Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung Huang, 
2006], choosing any and improving it by the top-trading-cycles method improperly 
ignores the power players have to object to being part of coalitions, as discussed in 
Section 3. Worse even, it ignores the potential of threat-making to deter an outcome. 
 
Definition 4.22 (undeterable coalitions) 
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We say that a coalition Coal = <C, Mc> is undeterable if no player or coalition of 
players outside Coal.C can force some player in C to end up matched with a girl 
outside Mc or with a girl in Mc who is below his Bottom(). 
Note that a player b may be forced from Mc(b) under the definition, but not from all girls 
in Mc who are above his Bottom(b). 
 
We also say that a coalition Coal is undeterable (or holds control over a set of girls) 
with regard to a set S of external players if definition 4.22 (undeterable coalitions) holds 
when the set of external players (B\Coal.C) is limited to just S. 
| 
Discussion: We say that the set of players C holds control over the set of girls in Mc.  
 
Lemma 4.23 (condition for undeterability of coalitions)  
A coalition Coal = <C, Mc> is undeterable if there exists a “worst case” perfect 
matching Mw, reachable from Mc, defined as follows: Each boy b in C gets an edge to 
all girls g in Mc, which satisfy (i) g is at or above Bottom(b); (ii) there are no external 
players (in B\Coal.C) holding direct veto power over b at g. 
The converse is true for non-augmented problem instances (thus dropping condition 
(i)). 
We say that the matching Mw is reachable from Mc iff should any boy b be kicked out 
from Mc(b), he can trigger a play, which comprises only girls in Mc and culminates with 
Mw-1(Mc(b)) at Mc(b) and the matching Mw is still reachable from the new matching (or 
coincides with it).  
 
Proof: ‘’ Suppose some external player in B\Coal.C played successfully at some girl 
in Mc, kicking out boy b. Then b can generate a play the play which places Mw-1(Mc(b)) 
at Mc(b) and still preserves Mw’s reachability, consisting of girls only in Mc. Such a play 
preserves the conditions that all girls in Mc are occupied by coalition boys. Ultimately 
there will be no more direct vetoes (for example the matching becomes Mw). 
‘’: If there exists no such perfect matching Mw, then the external players have an 
easy strategy: So long as there exists an uncoupled external boy holding direct veto 
power over some girl in Mc, he exercises it (he makes that proposal). All such direct 
vetoes are exercised. What can be the end result? Either some external boy ends up 
occupying a girl in Mc, OR there are no more external boys holding veto (since all 
external boys exercise their vetoes first, they cannot end up coupled outside Mc so long 
as they still have a direct veto power). In the second case, the resulting matching of 
boys in Coal.C to girls in Mc would meet the conditions of the perfect matching Mw. 
Thus, the first case in which the coalition outcome was successfully vetoed must be 
true. 
| 
Discussion: Note that the converse statement is not necessarily true for an augmented 
problem instance. There can be undeterable coalitions for an augmented problem 
instance which do not satisfy the conditions of Lemma 4.23, because some boys might 
be restricted from taking certain plays by existence of their Bottom(). Also, although a 
coalition might be deterable, the players which hold direct veto power over it might 
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have no interest to exercise it (for example, they may get their first choice on a girl 
outside those in the coalition matching). However, the only guaranteed outcome is the 
worst case Mw matching in a coalition which is undeterable. 
 
Note that Lemma 4.23 also provides an O(n3) worst case method to determine if any 
fixed set players holds control for sure over any fixed set of girls, under the criteria of 
the Lemma: A maximum matching algorithm is run on a graph instance constructed as 
described in Lemma 4.23, with the initial temperature of all the girls being nill (they are 
unmatched). The total time to construct such a graph can be as low as O(n2) (it is O(n3) 
naively) and running the matching algorithm takes an extra O(|C|3) worst case, for a 
total running time of no worse than O(n3). 
 
When a coalition has control over a set of girls, the only reason some other external 
player(s) would play at the one of the coalition girls is to degrade the outcome of some 
players in the coalition, maybe down to some Mw. But if that worst case outcome is 
acceptable to the boys in the coalition, then such a vengeful action will produce no 
results. However, it may also not entail any cost: the vetoing player(s) will be 
uncoupled in the end again. Then again, should some boys in the coalition choose to 
punish the vetoing player(s), then he (or them) might actually end up worse-off than if 
he had not vetoed. 
 
Definition 4.24 (external stability of matchings) 
We say that for a coalition Coal = <C, Mc>, the coalition matching Mc is externally 
stable iff there are no external players holding direct veto power over it. 
 
Again we expand the terminology to include external stability with regard to a set S of 
external players. 
| 
Discussion: Clearly, the existence of an externally stable matching implies the coalition 
holds control over the girls in Mc. However, not all matchings over these girls to the 
coalition boys may be externally-stable, or result in an undeterable coalition.  
 
Note also that a coalition can safely play directly to any of its externally stable 
matchings. No external players would be able to alter the outcome. However, some 
matchings which are not externally stable could result from normal play (for example 
when the veto holders are best preferred by their own first preference which lies 
outside the girls divided by the coalition). 
 
Note that a coalition having control over a certain set of girls, might choose to include 
new players which, in exchange for their contribution to the overall control over the new 
set of girls, are promised some girl from the initial set (which they could not get without 
cooperation of players in the coalition). 
For Example 4.9 (devilish alliance), note that the boys B\{b1} have control (under some 
set of girls’ preferences compatible with the plays) over the girls G\{g8}. As such, if 
such a coalition forms, b1 cannot get any of these girls and has to settle for g8. 
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However, he still can wreak some havoc first, by vetoing b4 from g1, etc., as illustrated 
in the Example. However, should b1 not be satisfied with g8 (for an augmented 
problem instance, maybe g8 is below his Bottom(b1)), the coalition could propose to 
him by offering him g2, in exchange for cooperation. In this manner, the cooperative 
outcome of Example 4.9 (devilish alliance) can ensue. Furthermore, one can say that 
that coalition B\{b1} has a threat over b1 above g8 (they can prevent b1 from getting 
better than g8). Note that although {b4} might have control both of {g4} and {g10}, he 
cannot alone have control over {g4, g10}. Thus, while the coalition B\{b4} does not 
have control over any set (since any set of appropriate size encompasses either g4 or 
g10), it still can guarantee that the outcomes will be from a certain set. Furthermore, 
the coalition B\{b4,b9,b10} has control over {g1,g2,g3,g5,g6,g7,g8}. However, the 
externally stable matching B\{b4,b9,b10} can offer is either the same as that by B\{b1} 
or worse for some players. Which coalition can prevail to convince the rest to 
cooperate? The first must convince b1; the second must convince b4. Hence a 
standoff situation. 
 
We now examine an approach which seeks to address the situation around standoffs. 
 
Definition 4.25 (agreements) 
A special kind of promise, is “a promise over a promise”. That is, player b promises P 
with the condition C = “if some other specific player b2 (or set of players) 
makes/doesn’t make another specific promise P2”, and the content “I will then also 
make (a distinct) promise P1.”. 
 
Such a promise P is essentially a binding offer (or threat) of agreement: b binds 
himself that if b2 promises P2 he will then promise P1. Since promises are binding, 
there can be no cheating in an agreement. If b2 makes promise P2, the automatically 
b’s promise P1 will be in effect. 
 
Futhermore, b could also promise that if b2 offers the converse promise (to bind 
himself to promising P2 if b promises P1) then he will make the promise P1. This way 
agreements could be reached simultaneously. 
| 
Discussion: We introduce agreements to allow the posibility that players can force 
themselves to respect joint strategies even when their threats are rejected. Since 
“keeping a promise” is always possible by any player voluntarily, there is not always a 
need for some central authority or “law of nature” to prohibit breaking of promises. It 
could be that players adequatelly describe their mental states which will not change in 
that regard. Notice again that making promises is not required. Some players may 
make no promises at all. 
 
One can attempt to determine some theoretical optimal potential outcome for some 
fixed boy b. Consider the algorithmic approach below. 
 
Algorithm 4.26 (expanding wrath approach) 
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The following algorithm seeks to determine if there exists a possible resolution to 
standoff situations where boy b gets girl g or better. Initially the routine below is called 
with Coal = Empty_Set. 
 
0: Initialize Lower[b]nill for all b in B. 
1: bool IsOutcomeFeasible(B, G, Pb, Pg, b, g, Coal) { 
2: Set Coal.C  Coal.C U {b} and Lower[b]  g. 
3: Does there exist a perfect matching of each boy b2 in Coal.C to a girl g2 
which at or better preferred than his respective Lower[b2]? If not, return false. 
4: Does there exist a perfect matching of each boy b2 in Coal.C to a girl g2 
which at or better preferred than his respective Lower[b2], which is externally 
stable? If yes, return true. 
5: For each boy b1 in B\Coal.C { //Try to expand the coalition by this boy 
6: Let Sx be the maximal set of top preferences of boy b1 (i.e. his top x 
preferences), such that Coal.C has control over this set Sx with regard to {b1}. 
//This is the set from which b1 can be expelled by the coalition. 
7: Let g1 be the least preferred girl by b1 in set Sx.  
8: If(IsOutcomeFeasible(B, G, Pb, Pg, b1, g1, Coal)) return true; 
9: Lower[b1]  nill. 
10: }// line 5. 
11: return false; 
12:} //line 1. 
| 
Discussion: The algorithm essentially considers all permutations under which a 
coalition can grow from just <{b}, {b – some girl at or above g}> to an undeterable one, 
such that, at each expansion, the new boy joining the coalition is offered something he 
certainly could not get if the coalition thus-far was hostile to him. The algorithm thus 
can be used to determine the proper order in which boys could be made “bitter-sweet” 
offers before the beginning of the game, to tempt them to join the coalition. In case 
some boy along this feasible path refuses, he can be punished by the boys in the 
coalition. However, if he cooperates and all future boys cooperate he will get a better 
matching. Since the first non-cooperator will be the one who will be surely worse-off, 
no one has the interest to be the first to refuse cooperation. Inductively, all boys 
(including future ones) will cooperate, if the algorithm returns true. This, of course, 
assumes that none reject the “bitter-sweet” Ultimatum of the coalition. For this, all 
ultimatums have to be credible: should an ultimatum be rejected, the boys in the 
coalition must be prepared to occupy all girls in the respective Sx set. For an 
augmented problem instance, this means that at the very least each girl they occupy 
must be at or above their respective Bottom(). Furthermore, stand-offs need to be 
resolved in b’s favor always. Nevertheless, if these conditions are met, should the 
algorithm return true, then boy b has a strategy to get girl g or better (under the 
assumption players are allowed to make agreements, as per Definition 4.25 
(agreements)): the matching determined when in line 4 true was returned is the final 
outcome for the boys in b’s coalition; b then makes the bitter sweet offer for this 
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outcome to the other players – should all accept – and demands promises that they all 
punish the first non-cooperator in the sequence should one of them not accept.  
 
One might run the above algorithm for all boys, binary searching the highest girl they 
could attain if all standoffs are resolved in their favor. Clearly if results differ for different 
boys, then a real standoff situation exists. Some of them need to back down. How to 
determine who would do this is again an interesting question: maybe the ones which 
would get hurt the must under a don’t cooperate / don’t cooperate situation. 
Complications clearly arise in answering this different question. 
 
Note that Algorithm 4.26 only produces meaningful results if the boys are allowed to 
communicate before the beginning of play, making and responding to Ultimatums and 
proposals. Note that in this instance, the strategy implied by Algorithm 4.26 also works 
with mere static strategy profiles – a profile is chosen as either the cooperation 
matching, or the punishment matching for the first non-cooperating player. If, however 
players are not allowed to negotiate before the play, a dynamic strategy profile might or 
might not exists for each coalition player to punish the first non-cooperator: it depends 
on whether the punishment matching is reachable from the Game_State the coalition 
boys find themselves in after the first iteration of the Dynamic Game Model 4.6. Thus 
the situation when a boy is lying when accepting to be part of a coalition is not handled. 
 
Unfortunately, Algorithm 4.26 (expanding wrath approach) runs in super-polynomial 
time.  
 
Theorem 4.27 (running time of Algorithm 4.26) 
The total running time of the Algorithm 4.26 is no more than O(n! * n5 * log n). 
 
Proof: The depth of the recursive calls of the routine is at most n, with each potential 
sequence of boys appearing at most once. Thus, there are at most n! potential stacks 
of recursive calls of routine IsOutcomeFeasible(), each being comprised of at most n 
players. The running time at each level in the stack is the total time taken by lines 2-6. 
Line 2 can be made to take O(1). Line 3 can take no more than O(n3) using the 
maximum matching algorithm based on Ford-Fulkerson [14]. Line 4 also takes no more 
than O(n3) once the input graph has been constructed (which takes at most O(n2) if 
done efficiently, or O(n3) naively). Line 5 is executed at most n times. In line 6, one can 
use binary search on the set size to determine the maximal Sx, running a maximal 
matching algorithm at each iteration, for a total running time of O(n3 * log n). Line 6 is 
also executed at most n times, for a total of O(n4 * log n). Thus, the total running time 
of lines 2-6 is O(n4 * log n). There are at most n executions of these lines in a 
particular stack of recursive calls, for a total of O(n5 * log n). The total number of stacks 
is no more than n! so the total running time is no more than O(n! * n5 * log n). 
| 
Discussion: Note that this worst-case bound for the running time would make the 
algorithm feasible up until n = 12 for an ordinary computer. Not that much. It provides, 
nevertheless a useful framework to reason about threat making and a starting point for 
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future refinements.  
 
Note that the Algorithm 4.26 (expanding wrath approach) can produce false negatives: 
A boy might still be able to get a girl for which the algorithm returns false: for example 
some boy for which the set Sx is empty when he is considered in the algorithm, might 
actually not be able to get any of his higher preferences than some set of girls 
controlled by the coalition, due to plays by the other external players (e.g. his first 
preference prefers another external player who also prefers her first). Thus, he could 
be coopted by the coalition even though no such option is revealed in line 6 of the 
algorithm. Furthermore, the coalition outcome might never be externally stable, but no 
external boy might be interested to veto the coalition: if Example 4.9 (devilish alliance), 
is extended to include another boy, b11 who is the first preference of all the girls and 
who prefers girl g11 tops, then the algorithm will terminate (quite quickly) with a false 
negative for any other boy.  
 
Running the Algorithm 4.26 (expanding wrath approach) for b4 – g1 for Example 4.9 
(devilish alliance), would yield the desired coalition, under the permutation <b4, b9, 
b10, b2, b5, b7, b8, b6, b3, b1> for example. Note that running it for b1 – g1 returns 
(under proper choice of girls’ preferences) false: the maximal alliance b1 can muster is 
<b1, b3, b6, b8, b7, b5, b2> which is not externally stable and cannot promise 
anything of interest to b4 to coopt him. While this is correct (b1 cannot be sure he will 
get g1), it might still be that b4 will settle for g10 instead of exercising revenge over b1 
and ending up worse off, thus allowing b1 to be coupled with g1. However, the 
algorithm properly reveals the situation that b4 can offer b1 something in exchange for 
cooperation, while b1 cannot offer b4 anything he cannot take for himself. 
 
To try to resolve the issue of false negatives, the following need to be addressed: 
 The girl g1 which is currently determined in lines 6-7, must be the one right 
above the first girl the candidate boy b1 could get if he ignores the coalition 
(which becomes hostile to him). Determining such a girl is no easy task: he may 
or may not be helped by the other external players in getting a good outcome! 
 In determining external stability of a matching, one should ignore players which 
have no interest in vetoing a coalition. This is also no easy task: An external 
player may be coerced or outright forced by other external players (an 
alternative coalition) to exercise such a veto! Even if this is not the case, 
determining that he can get a better outcome by not vetoing (or that he can be 
dearly punished for a veto) is no easy task!  
 
We hope the concepts and results introduce in this section shed some light into the 
important issue of strategic play in a stable marriage game when threats and dynamic 
strategies are permitted. Since as far as we know this topic has not been addressed so 
far in literature under the assumption set and model of this section, we leave further 
developments and refinements for future research. 
 
In particular, we leave several open questions which are explicitly stated in Section 8. 
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5. FURTHER POSSIBILITIES 
 
In this section we discuss a few other forms of strategic play might affect the potential 
outcome for a player. Except threat-making, is there any other way in which he can 
hope to improve his outcome? We also briefly state how such situations might come 
into being. 
 
There are six situations we analyze which can contribute to altering a boy’s outcome: 
1. Removing a boy from play: The set B decreases by the removed.  
2. Adding a boy to play: The set B increases with the added boy. 
3. Removing a girl from play: The set G decreases with the removed girl.  
4. Adding a girl to play: The set G increases with the added girl. 
5. Convincing other players to side with them in coalitions, without making any 
offers to improve their matching or threats to degrade it. 
6. Controlling a set of drone players: players which are not interested in their own 
individual matching, but instead are controlled by some other player which 
dictates their play. 
  
In this section we deal with existential questions only: can such situations generate a 
better or worse outcome for a particular player? We ask these question in the 
framework of four different models: 
 Naïve Gale-Shapely 
 Top-trading-cycles matching as per [10 - Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley 
Stable Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung Huang, 2006] 
 Coalition stable matching as per Section 3 
 General situations with threats and dynamic strategies as per Section 4. 
 
If the outcome can be improved by the specific situation we ask, what actual such 
operations would need to be performed (or can be performed) for some boy b to end 
up coupled with some higher option girl g. It is obvious that in the first four situations 
the operation can have no effect: for example, if the acted on boy is the last preference 
of all girls, respectively the acted on girl is the last preferences of all the boys. 
 
Removing a boy from play 
 
Under the naïve Gale-Shapely play, removal of a boy can only improve (or leave 
unchanged) the outcomes for the others. Removal of a boy implies removal of the 
proposals he makes. This in turn can only result in potential removal of other proposals 
by others as their parent set becomes empty, under Definition 3.27 (information about 
elements). To model the effects of removing a boy, one might just run Gale-Shapely 
again over the remaining boys. Trying to maintain the tree of proposals under deletion 
does not immediately lead to a better running time algorithm. 
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Clearly removing all boys b1 which propose in Gale-Shapely to g and beat b there will 
allow b to get g. However, it may not be necessary to remove all such boys (or any of 
them at all!). Consider the situation in Example 3.29 (inferno of boy b). All players 
attain optimal outcome if boy only b is removed (while they are all beaten at this 
optimal outcome by n-1 players which, if boy b is not eliminated, all propose). Same 
applies if boy b1 is removed in that example. Furthermore, if we were to extend 
Example 3.29 (inferno of boy b) with another pair say boy b’ and girl g’ such that b has 
g’ as his first preference but is beaten there by b’, then removing b’ (which does not 
even propose to g, g1,…,gn) allows b1 to get girl g1 for example. 
  
Under the top-trading-cycles method, removal of a boy might improve the outcomes of 
a player by improving the Gale-Shapely he is considered to have control over and thus 
be able to trade, as discussed above. However, it might as well degrade his outcome 
by removing a potential trading partner. Consider Example 3.1. If boy b2 and b7 are 
removed, then boy b4 no longer has a trading cycle to his first preference, g3 and is 
stuck with g2. 
 
Under the coalition stable method of Section 3, removal of a boy can definitely improve 
the outcome for the others, since it can improve the Gale-Shapely matching the play of 
each iteration (in particular the first), as discussed further above. However, it can also 
degrade it. In Example 3.1, if b7 was to be removed, b6 would become a fist-iteration 
hopeless man (alongside b5), his outcome degrading to g6. 
 
Under the general game model when threats are permitted, clearly removing a threat 
yielding boy can improve the outcome for some – as it is easier for them to construct 
externally stable matchings: consider removing b4 from Example 4.9 (devilish 
alliance). Just as well, removing a boy might also degrade the outcome for some of the 
others: he is no longer available as a potential valuable member of a coalition. In 
Example 4.9, removing b9 would make b4 unable to kick b1 out of g3, his second 
option. He still has the option of kicking b1 from the fought-for g1. This option also 
vanishes if b2 is removed instead of b9. Note that in this latter case, the outcome for 
b9 is also degraded (since b4 will play to his second choice, g10, being unable to deter 
b1 from occupying his beloved g1). Note that b2 was considered in Example 4.9 a 
naïve player and was not explicitly required to be part of the coalition, merely to try to 
get as good an outcome for himself as he could. 
 
How might a boy be removed from play in real-life? Most economic models allow for 
several situations, like: 
 The player not being knowledgeable about the existence of the girls under 
dispute (i.e. playing the game knowing just a subset of the available girls), thus 
having the effect of being as-if absent. 
 The player being offered incentives (or threatened with disincentives) outside 
the game model to refrain from participating in a particular instance of the game. 
Regulatory requirements might apply making it risky for a player to engage in 
the game (for example a US small-sized actor to have business deals with a 
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Caspian See, Middle-eastern country). Incentives offered within the scope of the 
game, can be modeled as offers to join a coalition. 
 Offering him another girl, outside those under dispute, to leave the game 
(potentially a girl which is not known to the other boys and, as such, does not 
get better proposals). 
 The prospect of future repeat plays of the game including the same set of 
players which asked him to leave that particular instance, which may, in turn, do 
the same for him in the future (or have already done so in the past). 
 
Adding a boy to play 
 
Adding a boy has the opposite effect on the game instance as removing him from the 
new game instance has. Except for the naïve Gale-Shapely, we discussed above that 
removal of a player can either benefit or hurt other players. As such, adding one can 
either hurt or benefit others. For the naïve Gale-Shapely case it is also trivial that 
adding a boy can degrade the outcome for others. 
 
How might a boy be added to play in real-life? Most economic models allow for several 
situations, like: 
 A player priory not being knowledgeable about the existence of the girls under 
dispute (i.e. playing the game knowing just a subset of the available girls), is 
made aware of them. 
 The player being offered incentives (or threatened with disincentives) outside 
the game model to participate in a particular instance of the game. For example, 
he could be incentivized to participate by including the girl he is already coupled 
with in the game. If he does not participate, he risks losing that matching. 
 The player is being made eligible to participate in the game (for example, by 
paying his entrance fee, or facilitating him getting a required letter of credit). 
 The player is raised up the preference list of some girls, by altering the 
underlying criteria pertaining to him, based on which the girls decided the 
preference ranking (for example, by increasing his wealth or having him become 
part of a more affluent entourage). 
 The prospect of future repeat plays of the game including the same set of 
players which asked him to join that particular instance, which may, in turn, do 
the same for him in the future (or have already done so in the past). 
 
Removing a girl from play 
 
Removing a girl might leave fewer girls than boys. For this reason, by convention, 
removal implies substituting the removed girl with another fictitious girl, which lies at 
the end of the preference lists of all the boys. If any boy ends up coupled with the 
fictitious girl, he is in effect uncoupled. There can be more than one fictitious girl. They 
all represent the situation where the respective boys are uncoupled. The preferences 
of the fictitious girls themselves are irrelevant: should one be under dispute; the loosing 
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boy always has another (equally fictitious) girl which is uncoupled. The assumption is, 
of course, that boys will seek to avoid remaining uncoupled, by proposing to a fictitious 
girl. 
 
Under the naïve Gale-Shapely play, removal of a (non-fictitious) girl will definitely 
degrade the outcome for at least one boy – the one who would end up with her –, if the 
number of players is less than that of (non-fictitious) girls after the removal. Removal of 
a girl can also degrade the outcome for others: e.g. removing the first preference of a 
strong player (which would remain coupled with her), might trigger a long play, 
degrading the outcome of several boys. For illustration, consider that in Example 3.29 
(inferno of boy b), that boy b’s first preference (where he would play unchallenged) 
was removed and replaced by the fictitious girl g. The result is catastrophic for all 
players. Under naïve Gale-Shapely, removal of a girl cannot improve the outcomes for 
any boy: removal only has the effect of more proposals being made to the remaining 
girls, which can only increase (or leave unchanged) their temperature. 
 
Under the top-trading-cycles method, removal of a girl can clearly degrade the final 
outcome as it can degrade the Gale-Shapely outcome which is used to determine 
which girls are controlled by which boys, which can then be traded. However, it might 
also improve the outcome for some: e.g. a boy whose first preference is removed, 
causing him to remain coupled in Gale-Shapely with his third preference, will be very 
interested to trade her for his second preference, thus potentially becoming part of a 
trading cycle (which he was not when he got his first preference directly). 
 
Under the coalition-stable matching, removal of a girl can clearly degrade the outcome 
for some boys, as it negatively impacts the Gale-Shapely outcomes (e.g. the outcome 
of the first round), as discussed further above. Removal can also positively affect the 
outcome for some boys: a boy whose first preference is removed, can oust another 
player from his third preference, causing him to be that round’s hopeless man; once 
that man is no longer considered (being hopeless in that round), the first player can 
remain (in the next round) with his second preference, which was occupied by 
someone having the latter’s third preference as first preference and who, before the 
freshly hopeless man was eliminated, would not have been able to remain with her 
(due to the freshly hopeless man, which was not hopeless before). 
 
Under the general game model, removal of a girl can both degrade the outcome for a 
player (e.g. the first preference of a boy first preferred by all girls is removed) and 
improve it: a boy external to some coalition may more easily be subjected to a bitter-
sweet threat, consisting of an offer to remain coupled with a girl over which belongs to 
a set of girls controlled by the coalition, since he has fewer outside options.  
 
Note that removing a girl can sometimes be viewed as adding the boy who priory 
remained coupled with the removed girl. 
 
How might a girl be removed from play in real-life? Most economic models allow for 
Copyright (c) Mircea Digulescu 
- 60 - 
several situations, like: 
 Keeping the players from being knowledgeable about the existence of the 
removed girl, thus having the effect of her being as-if absent. 
 The girl being offered incentives (or threatened with disincentives) outside the 
game model to refrain from participating in a particular instance of the game. 
The same can apply to boys being affected in this manner to abstain from 
playing at that girl. 
 Jamming the “communication channels” to the girl, effectively preventing her 
from receiving or responding to proposals. 
 Degrading the characteristics of the girl so that she becomes least preferred by 
all the boys. 
 Offering the girl another boy, outside those taking part in the game, to leave the 
game (potentially a boy may not be aware of all the other girls in play; or may be 
aware of just a subset of the boys in play – which would make him wrongly 
estimate his outcome under a coalition/threat strategy). Note that a girl might not 
be interested to leave the game since, should she not leave, she might get an 
even better outcome than the promised boy (who can still propose to her). 
However, if that boy could get himself a better outcome than her should both 
part-take in the game, then she might as well accept him and leave the game.    
 The prospect of future repeat plays of the game including the same set of 
players/girls which asked her to leave that particular instance, which may, in 
turn, do the same for him in the future (or have already done so in the past). 
Note that when the removal of a girl has negative impact on the outcomes for 
some players, it must have positive impact on the outcome for some girls. 
 
Adding a girl to play 
 
Adding a girl has the opposite effect on the game instance as removing her from the 
new game instance has. Except for the naïve Gale-Shapely, we discussed above that 
removal of a girl can either benefit or hurt other players. As such, adding one can either 
hurt or benefit others.  
 
For the naïve Gale-Shapely case it is also trivial that adding a girl cannot degrade the 
outcome since she is either ignored, or she is the object of some proposals which 
might in the end leave other girls at a lower temperature. 
 
How might a girl be added in real-life play? Most economic models allow for several 
situations, like: 
 Making the players in the game aware of her existence, assuming they were not 
aware of it before. 
 Allowing some boy she was priory coupled with to renounce her and become 
uncoupled (perhaps to join the game), thus also leaving her uncoupled and 
incentivizing her to join the game. In real life economic situations this can 
happen for example at the expiration of the term of a contract (e.g. for leasing 
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real-estate, for doing consultancy work, etc.). 
 Improving the characteristics of a priory “as-if fictitious” girl so that she becomes 
considered by the boys (e.g. renovating a house, having a renowned professor 
join a school, etc.). 
 
Coopting players in coalitions without incentivizing them within the game 
 
We refer to situations when a player is no better - no worse off by joining a coalition. 
This can happen with the accomplices of the top-trading-cycles method described in 
[10 - Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung 
Huang, 2006], with the hopeless men of each round in the coalition stable matching 
Algorithm 3.22 – dropping Assumption 3.10 (self-interest and no taking of sides), or, in 
the case of the general game model, with a player who cannot be coerced or 
incentivized by a coalition (already getting a better outcome than the coalition might 
offer), but who voluntarily joins it, engaging in threat-making over other players. Clearly 
there can be no relevant situations in naïve Gale-Shapely since that game model 
allows no coalitions or decisions. 
 
Under the top trading cycles method, clearly all accomplices need to support the 
coalition of the boys who are part of a trading cycle, thus effectively joining it. Since 
they are not part of any cycle themselves, they do not get a better outcome. However, 
they don’t get a worse outcome either by supporting. It could be nevertheless, that they 
might have a preference for some other boy to get as good an outcome as possible. In 
this case, certain trading cycles (over which the accomplices have legitimate direct 
veto power) cannot materialize.  
 
Under the coalition stable matching, in each round of Algorithm 3.22, the hopeless men 
might also have a preference to help some other remaining boy, in exchange for them 
playing directly to their final match in that round. 
 
Note that in both situations, such side-taking is equivalent to threat-making, except that 
threats are enabled only by legitimate direct vetoes, not any kind of direct vetoes. The 
complications revealed by Section 4 can easily spur: stand-offs might emerge between 
different players which old direct legitimate veto over each other’s preferred matching 
for their friend player; in Algorithm 3.22, players eliminated earlier can threaten later 
rounds players not to favor any other boy then their friend, under threat of not playing 
directly to their coalition stable girl – they might also collude in doing this; in the top-
trading-cycles method players might be threatened that their own trading-cycles would 
be vetoed if they do not support a better outcome for some other player. In effect, 
reducing the spectrum of direct vetoes to include just legitimate direct vetoes does not 
seem to simplify the general case much. Enabling threats only to legitimate vetoes can, 
in Algorithm 4.26 (expanding wrath approach) for instance, be modeled by disallowing 
edges to girls below a player’s matching (under Algorithm 3.22 or Gale-Shapely).  
 
Under general play, a further situation might arise: A player might join a coalition 
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without being coerced or offered any incentive (e.g. a player who gets his first choice, 
might still join a coalition). In this situation, more sets of girls can fall under the control 
of the coalition, potentially allowing it to grow further, for example under Algorithm 4.26 
(expanding wrath approach). Note that in the general model however, a player joining a 
coalition without consideration might not be considered credible by the others. Under 
Algorithm 4.26 for example, he might be required to make threats of plays to girls 
below what he would get if he didn’t join the coalition. Since he has no incentive to join 
the coalition in the first place, such threats could be considered non-credible. The issue 
can be resolved however if he is allowed to make threats only of exercising direct 
legitimate vetoes – only playing to girls at or above the girl he would remain coupled 
with if he didn’t join. Note that these independent players might not join any coalition at 
all. They may simply play as if they were naïve players and still end-up with one of their 
top preferred girls – they cannot be deterred from all by any rational coalition. 
 
How can players be incentivized to join a coalition which does not offer them any 
improvement (but does not degrade their outcome either)? Among others: 
 Players could have a preference for someone introducing them to the game 
(e.g. by revealing certain priory unknown girls or other players). 
 Players could be offered side-payments. Note that in this case, in the models we 
examined we required that a player is interested foremost by his resulting 
matching. Side-payments could thus only be used to break ties among different 
strategies all of which produce the same outcome in the game for the player. 
One relevant model with general transferable utility has been analyzed in [13 - 
Designing a strategic bipartite matching market, Rahul Jain, 2007]. 
 Players might consider the prospect of future repeat plays of the game including 
the same player(s) who asked for support in that particular instance, who may, 
in turn, return the favor in the future (or have already done so in the past).  
 Players could be friends, thus favoring each other if that does not hurt their own 
outcome. 
 
Drone players 
 
A slight variation to the game model is to allow the existence of players whose play is 
entirely dictated by another player (under a static or, respectively, dynamic strategy 
profile). Introduction of drone players may be accompanied by the introduction of extra 
(potentially fictitious) girls so that the total number of players does not exceed the 
number of girls. 
 
Under naïve Gale-Shapely, introduction of extra players – be they drones or not – can 
only degrade the outcome, as discussed priory in this section. 
 
Under the top-trading-cycles method, a boy is interested in one of his drones ending up 
coupled with his target girl, so that they could later switch. If that is not possible, he 
could be interested that his drones complete a trading cycle which includes him and his 
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target girl: namely that one of them occupies a girl better preferred by another boy, who 
occupies a girl better preferred by yet another and so on, culminating with the target 
girl. Note that is not useful to have more than one drone on a trading cycle since, 
considering the trading cycle starting from the target girl, once it comprises the first 
drone, that drone could as well occupy the girl held by the controller, thus leaving the 
target girl for him, completing the cycle. The rest of the drones might still be useful in 
pushing other players on that trading cycle from their higher-up preferences, thus 
making the cycle possible (which may, in the end, not necessarily include a drone).  
Note however, that under this approach, the drone which is part of the cycle (if any), 
might be better preferred by the girl the controller ends up with. In this situation, an 
automated system might not even permit that the drone does not play first to the girl 
the controller would trade to the drone, thus making the trade no longer possible. This 
might be circumvented by the introduction of a special girl (least preferred by all 
others), the controller can end up with and trade with the drone. However, this might 
prevent the controller from ousting some of boys which are part of the trading cycle, 
from their better preferences. 
 
Under the coalition stable matching, introducing drones can be useful. At the very least 
they can be regarded as players who never play to the controller’s target girl. This can 
sometimes be sufficient in itself as discussed priory in this section, regarding Adding 
Players. Sometimes however drones should play to the target girl of the controller – if 
he was kicked-out of there, they may need to also kick out the kicker so that he 
becomes a hopeless man in an earlier round than the controller. In fact, in the round in 
which the controller would become hopeless under Algorithm 3.22 without existence of 
drones, the controller should play (successfully!) to a girl occupied by a drone who 
must trigger a play which kicks-out the player who kicked him out from the target girl 
(ideally making him hopeless). This way, he does not risk being made hopeless by one 
of his own drones who beats him at the target girl. In fact, if a boy has at his disposal a 
drone which would beat any contender at his target girl, he could always “wake up” that 
when kicked out from this girl. This assumes, of course, that there exists a girl which 
ends up occupied by the drone where he beats the drone. Such a girl could be 
introduced artificially, by Adding a girl: some girl least preferred by all others. 
 
Under the general play, introducing drones can be provide a great advantage to the 
coalition of its controller by potentially causing new sets of girls to fall under the control 
of the coalition or which can be denied to some other boy in case of non-cooperation, 
in the course of Algorithm 4.26 (expanding wrath approach) for example. The drones 
have the added advantage that they can settle for any outcome, thus not being an 
impediment to any matching which includes them. Algorithm 4.26 could be extended to 
include drones by not considering them part of the players when determining the 
existence of a matching in lines 3 and 4, but considering them otherwise. 
 
Note that in all cases where drones are used, it could be useful if they are allowed to 
just “hover” unmatched until their controller “wakes them up” to make some proposal. 
This however is not currently permitted by either the Dynamic Game Model 4.6 or the 
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Simplified Game Model 2.10. 
 
We conclude this section by leaving open the questions of finding an efficient algorithm 
to determine, for set of optional players (and potentially another of optional girls), which 
should be added and which excluded by a player in order to gain an optimal outcome. 
The brute force method would imply solving the instance for each potential choice, 
adding an exponential factor to the running time. 
 
6. VARIATIONS TO THE GAME MODEL 
 
In this section we discuss how several slight variations to the game model can be 
taken into account. 
 
Girls with more than one slot 
 
There are cases (for example in the student-program matching) when a girl can remain 
coupled with several boys. 
 
One way this could be modeled in the problem instance would be to group all slots for 
the same girl adjacently in the preference list of the boy corresponding to the position 
of that particular girl on his list. For example, Pb1= <g1-1,g1-2,g1-3,g2,g3-1,g3-2,g4>. 
If in the final matching a boy is coupled with any slot of a girl, then he is said to be 
coupled with that girl. The girl will have the same order of preference over the boys at 
each slot. When several boys compete for the same girl, they actually compete for a 
particular slot. The loser can the try to get the next slot and so on. By convention we 
could require that slots are grouped in the same order in all the boys’ preference lists. 
However, this is not required. In this situation a boy is considered indifferent among the 
slots of a particular girl. 
 
One can quickly note that running Gale-Shapely over this adjusted preference list 
produces a stable matching (no only over girl slots but over the girls themselves): the 
temperature of all slots of a girl will be above a certain boy if he proposes to her and 
ultimately does not get any of her slots. Furthermore, this stable matching is still man-
optimal (among other stable matchings), by the same arguments used for Gale-
Shapely. 
 
The top-trading-cycles method would also work unaffected over the new formulation of 
the problem: a trading cycles of girls by boys can be formulated as a trading cycle of 
the underling girl slot by boys. 
 
The coalition stable matching method also requires no further adjustment. All results 
still hold. 
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Under general play however, one has to consider the adjustment as with any case with 
indifference by boys, as is discussed further in this section. 
 
Note that this resolution to the indifference problem has the potential drawback of 
increasing the size of the problem: each girl may have up to n-1 slots (having more 
than that would make her able to accept all boys). Thus, the number of girl slots under 
the adjusted problem instance can grow to O(n2), which would adversely affect the 
running times of various algorithms. To circumvent the problem, one can instantiate 
slots only when they are effectively being used (about to be occupied by a boy who 
was kicked-out or refused at all prior slots), up until the slot count limit of the particular 
girl. In this manner there will not be more slots than man, with the naïve Gale-Shapely, 
top-trading-cycles method and coalition-stable matching Algorithm 3.22 maintaining 
their O(n2) running times. However, in the general play when threats are permitted, all 
slots count: a boy may seek refuge in a then-unused slot of a girl and a threatening 
player has to threaten him from all slots of a girl. Note that in all cases, just the top n 
preferences of slots (be they for the same or different girls) for each boy matter: he will 
definitely get one of those, no matter what. Thus any algorithm which is bound to 
walking the preference lists of boys will have an input of size O(n2).  
 
Indifference in preference lists of boys 
 
One can extend the idea of girl with multiple slots to generally allowing indifference in 
the preference lists of the boys. Note that unlike in [2 – Stable Marriage and 
indifference, Robert W. Irving, 1994] here we require that the preference lists of just the 
boys allow indifference, not that of girls too. 
 
Choosing an arbitrary order for the cases which give rise to indifference can be a 
useful way to generate an adjusted problem instance. 
 
As with the case above, in this situation Gale-Shapely will produce a stable matching. 
However, considering that some boys may be indifferent among several girls they 
could end up coupled with, choosing a particular girl from this set (effectively permuting 
the order in which the indifferent choices appear in the positions they occupy within the 
boy’s preference list) may make her unavailable to another boy who does not have the 
luxury of having several equally preferred choices to her that he could get. But 
choosing a different girl among those equally preferred, might make another boy worse 
off!  
 
Using the top-trading-cycles method to improve a matching can, of course, yield a 
better result for some boys, however with all the drawbacks applying this method in the 
usual case (with no indifference) has: the resulting matching may not have the support 
of players with legitimate direct veto power which can attain a better matching for 
themselves by including some other set of players in their coalition (often times just a 
subset). 
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Using the coalition stable matching Algorithm 3.22 still yields some valid result; 
however, the order in which a boy proposes to the girls at a certain level of preference 
affects the end result for the other players.   
 
Example 6.1 (order matters with indifference) 
 
Say the preference lists of the boys are as follows (with parenthesis being used to 
signify indifference). 
 
Preference of boys, in descending order (only relevant ones): 
Pb1 g1, g3, g2 
Pb2 g1, g2, g3  
Pb3 (g2, g3), g1 
 
Consider the following two alternative plays: 
 
Round b1: b1g1. 
Round b2: b2g1|b1g3. 
Round b3: b3g3(b1)|b3g1|b2g2. 
 
Here just b2 is a hopeless man (b1 is not because he defeated b3 at g3), ending up at 
g2. After being eliminated, in the next round b1 will get g1 and b3 will get g3. 
 
And: 
 
Round b1: b1g1. 
Round b2: b2g1|b1g3. 
Round b3: b3g2. 
 
 
Here both b1 and b3 are hopeless men, ending up at g3 and g2 respectively. After 
being eliminated, in the next round b2 will get g1. 
 
| 
Discussion: Notice how the difference in the order in which b3 exercised his proposals 
at a certain level of preference affected the outcome for the others. Also note that this 
order can only matter when a boy ends up at that level of preference: if he drops below 
it, he will surely have made all proposals at the prior level in that round’s Gale-Shapely. 
 
Thus, in the coalition stable matching, Assumption 3.10 (self-interest and no taking of 
sides) might no longer help in some situations: Proposing one way would disfavor one 
player, while proposing the other way will disfavor the other player.  
 
We might be able to improve the matching obtained by Algorithm 3.22 for some player, 
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by trying to find an alternating path consisting of that player being matched to some 
higher preference and all other players matched only to preferences at the same level 
of indifference as before. This can be determined with any walk of the bipartite graph, 
thus in time at most O(n2) for any single boy. Note however that improving the 
matching for two boys simultaneously might not be possible – thus some side would 
again have to ensue so as to determine for which one the matching will be improved. 
 
Under general play, there are two complications added by indifference: 
 When a boy is threatened from a girl, he must in fact be threatened from all girls 
at that level of preference; 
 When a boy is offered a girl, the offered girl must not be from the same level of 
preference as the boy would achieve without the assistance of the coalition. 
 
Algorithm 4.26 (expanding wrath approach) can be easily adjusted to handle both 
these complications, by restricting offers to the first girl in set Sx above the level of 
preference of the first girl outside it. However, these adjustments may cause the 
algorithm to produce false negatives more often (as a boy may not be able to get any 
girl at a particular preference level without the help of the coalition, even though the 
coalition alone cannot oust him from all such girls). 
 
Boys not knowing about all the girls in play 
 
Situation may often arise in real life situations when some boys are not aware of the 
entire set of available girls (e.g. a contractor may not be aware of or have access to all 
potential customers). 
 
In this circumstance, the affected boy effectively never proposes to a girl he is not 
aware of.  
 
We can impose this condition by adjusting the problem instance as follows: up to n 
fictitious girls are added: these girls are least preferred by all boys among all other girls 
(it does not matter what the relative order of preference among them is – a boy ending 
up coupled with a fictitious girl is considered uncoupled). Then, the preference lists of 
boys are adjusted (based on the true preference list) as follows: 
 All girls whom the boy is not aware of are removed from the preference list. 
 The preference list is then compacted by eliminating empty positions; 
 All free position up to the n-th in the boy’s preference list are occupied with 
fictitious girls. 
 After the fictitious girls, all girls removed initially from the list (the girls the boy is 
not aware of) are re-added (maybe in their actual order of preference). 
Also up to n fictitious boys will need to be added, all least preferred by all the girls 
(including fictitious ones). 
 
Since there are only n non-fictitious boys, a boy will surely remain matched with one of 
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his top n preferences. Thus, the reminder of his list is irrelevant. 
 
Note that this can at most quadruple the size of the problem instance. 
 
Naïve Gale-Shapely clearly will work in this case. Top-trading-cycles method would 
have to exclude the fictitious boys (or these boys could be made to prefer the fictitious 
girls tops); otherwise it works without modification. Same applies to the coalition stable 
matching Algorithm 3.22. 
 
Under the general play, the running time of algorithms may be adversely affected 
(since Algorithm 4.26 for example runs in time exponential in the size of the problem 
instance). However, the fictitious boys can never be useful to be included in coalitions 
– they have no threat yielding power. Nevertheless, coalitions which offer them “better 
than fictitious girls” might temporarily be considered – point out the weakness in terms 
of running time of Algorithm 4.26. 
 
Boys not knowing about all other boys 
 
Boys may not be aware of all the other players which exist in the game. This situation 
might be compounded with the one just discussed, where they are unaware of some of 
the girls part-taking in the game. 
 
Can this affect game-play? 
 
Under the naïve Gale-Shapely play, clearly no. A player just might be surprised in the 
end to learn that some boy he didn’t know was in the game occupied one of his 
preferences, or (directly or indirectly) the preference of some other boy who occupied 
his preference. 
 
Under the top-trading-cycles method – besides the possibility of the Gale-Shapely 
starting point being different to what a player expected – players which are not aware 
of each other (and are not introduced to each other) cannot trade with each other 
directly. A boy can be generally considered aware of what boy occupies a girl he knows 
was in play. As such, players unaware of each other may are typically also unaware of 
the girl occupied by the other. But even in this case, other players on a potential trading 
cycle might “intermediate” the trade – offering a “new and better” girl to each player 
who does not know the other party. However, trading cycles in which there is not a 
single boy who knows about all the others cannot materialize. Verifying the existence 
of a trading cycle could be done in O(n2), by doing a DF walk for each boy, only on 
other boys known to him (for whom he can serve as an intermediary in trades). 
 
Since the coalition stable matching essentially consists of running Gale-Shapely on 
smaller and smaller problem instances, with no intervention by the players, the only 
potential issue is that, again, they may be surprised (negatively or positively) at the end 
result being different than what they anticipated. 
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Under general play, boys a coalition is not aware of cannot be coopted in the coalition. 
Thus the coalition is potentially deprived of a useful advantage. Much more 
troublesome, strong unknown boys might emerge to veto (perhaps legitimately) a 
matching the coalition believed was externally stable.  
 
Girls as players 
 
In this paper, we made Assumption 2.1 (girls are robotic players). We argue that for the 
situation of Section 3, even if the girls are allowed to also propose this will not affect 
the outcome, since the boys, forming a grand coalition, can reject proposals by the 
girls outside their man-optimal matching. However, this argument assumed that the 
girls are still obligated to accept a proposal they receive (or get accepted) rather than 
remain uncoupled. Boys on the other hand can reject proposals they receive outside 
those themselves make. 
 
There are several potential variations to the game model which present themselves 
when girls are allowed to have decision points, thus becoming players: 
1. Girls being allowed to make proposals. In this variation, players from each group 
can have a single binding outstanding proposal and several received ones. They 
must then start rejecting proposals (which can never again be made), leaving 
out just the outstanding proposal and at most one received proposal. If their 
outstanding proposal gets rejected, they can make another one, or choose from 
one of the received proposals not already rejected. Since incoming proposals 
are guaranteed, one might think that it is optimal for a player to reject all 
received proposals, save the best. However, situations could occur where the 
outstanding proposals form a cycle in the bipartite graph of the game. Clearly 
the proposals on a cycle can never be all accepted. But which one (or which 
ones) get to be considered rejected? There is no fair answer in this case.  
We could also allow players to have more than one outstanding proposal. In this 
case, situations might arise where several outstanding proposals are accepted – 
in this case, the player would be unable to honor all of them. We could, of 
course, allow that a player changes his mind about an outstanding proposal, 
canceling it – as sometimes is the case in real-life play. The classical model of 
the stable marriage problem can be viewed as girls having such outstanding, 
cancelable proposals to all boys, with them canceling some lesser preferred one 
as they themselves get proposals by the boys. In real life situations it is 
sometimes the case that a player will make or accept a proposal tentatively – 
just waiting to get a better one. Furthermore, a player might lie to a proposer 
that his (her) offer was accepted so that he (she) is kept available as “worst 
case”, up until some timeout. This can cause the lied to player to ultimately get a 
worse outcome than if he hadn’t believed the acceptance of the offer, since he 
could have refused some offers in the interim, which are no longer available 
when he ultimately becomes free as the counterparties might have already 
entered binding arrangements with someone else. These kinds of situations 
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sometimes arise in real-life play. 
2. Girls being allowed to reject proposals better than their then-current partner. In 
this case we may require that once a proposal has been rejected, such a 
proposal cannot be made again at a later time – a girl cannot change her mind 
about preferring a boy from whom she rejected a proposal. In some real life 
cases (for example in contractor – client matching) this can clearly not be the 
case. However, often times it is. Furthermore, if we allowed rejected proposals 
to be later accepted, some boys might keep proposing to the same girl (e.g. 
their top choice) over and over in the hope the girl changed her mind. A standoff 
would occur as to which boy is the first to propose to another girl.  
A special case of this variation is when:  
o Girls are allowed to just permute the preference order for accepting 
proposals. In this special case girls have to state up-front an order of 
preference under which they accept proposals (which does not have to 
be the actually order of preference for the final matching). This is can be 
viewed just as girls “falsifying” their preference lists in all algorithms we 
presented in this paper. We call this situation as girls having static 
strategy profiles. 
 
If girls are allowed to reject proposals even when uncoupled, then the game can turn 
into one of ultimatum between boys and girls: with boys proposing just their man-
optimal coalition-stable outcome and girls accepting only some coalition-stable 
matching of their own (perhaps the man-optimal coalition stable matching for the 
converse problem instance – when the roles are switched between the two sets). If 
boys are forced to keep proposing if refused, then girls can force any outcome they 
collectively (all of them) choose. 
 
The situation where girls are allowed to rejected initial proposals in static strategy 
profiles can easily be modeled by adding one fictitious boy b’ for each girl g. The 
special boy b’ will have girl g as his only preference. Thus, girl g will be able to choose 
b’ instead of becoming coupled with any of the real boys. If we require that the number 
of boys and girls remains the same, we can also add another girl g’ (least preferred by 
all non-fictitious boys) which will b’’s second choice and for whom b’ is her first choice. 
In this circumstance it could occur that some boys and some girls remain uncoupled 
(i.e. the final result involves them being coupled with fictitious partners). 
 
In analyzing strategic plays involving girls, the first question we ask is “can girls benefit 
from having a static strategy profile other than the naïve one?”. Clearly if they collude 
among themselves in situations parallel to the one constructed in the paragraph above, 
they could get better outcomes. Even without being allowed to reject a first proposal, a 
coalition of girls might decide to refuse the other’s agreed on partner to the detriment of 
some boy outside their coalition matching (if, of course, there exists such a boy who 
proposes before or simultaneously with the first boy in the coalition matching). If for all 
boys in the coalition matching, the boy’s preferences between the first girl who takes 
part in the coalition and the girl in the coalition to whom he is “promised” consist only of 
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coalition girls (or other girls who reject him), under naïve Gale-Shapely play by the 
boys, the coalition outcome of the girls will be attained. 
It might be interesting to have an algorithm for determining potential coalitions of girls, 
along with associated outcomes for when boys are assumed to be robotic naïve Gale-
Shapely players. We leave this open for future research, maybe using [4 - Ms. 
Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem, David Gale and Marilda Sotomayor, 
1985] as a starting point. 
 
One very, very interesting case, which is sometimes easily overlooked is that of 
coalitions consisting of both boys and girls. In this paper we focused on generating a 
good outcome for some boy or boys, so we will keep this focus and ask: “might it be 
useful for a coalition of one or more boys to attract some girls to it?”. However, the 
question might be posed conversely too: “might joining some coalition of girls be useful 
for a boy?”. 
We discuss just the case where girls have static strategy profiles. The case when girls 
can reject proposals based on the full Game_State is more general. 
 
In engulfing a girl in a coalition, one first has to ask about what her motivation might be 
to join. In the scope of the game, we required that each player has the motivation to 
get as good an outcome as possible (with ties between strategies producing the same 
outcomes being broken in various manners). We can impose the same on girl-players. 
 
Note that even one girl alone might benefit from rejecting a boy, even under a static 
strategy profile.  
 
Example 6.2 (lone girl benefiting by rejecting proposal) 
 
Say the preference lists of the boys are as follows. 
 
Preference of boys, in descending order (only relevant ones): 
Pb1 g1, g2, g3 
Pb2 g2, g3  
Pb3 g2, g1, g3 
 
Preference of girls, in descending order (only relevant ones): 
Pg1 b3, b1 
Pg2 b1, b3, b2  
Pg3 - 
 
Consider the following two alternative plays: 
 
Round b1: b1g1. 
Round b2: b2g2. 
Round b3: b3g2|b2g3. 
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Here just g2 played naively, ending up with her second preference, namely b3. 
 
Alternatively: 
 
Round b1: b1g1. 
Round b2: b2g1. 
Round b3: b3g2(b2)|b3g1|b1g2|b2g3. 
 
Here g2 played strategically, refusing b3 even though he was preferred over b2, 
ending up however with her first preference, namely b1. 
| 
Discussion: Notice that in the second play, no boy is better off, with two boys being 
worse off. 
 
Can some boy or boys end up better off by including girls in their coalition, while also 
offering them better or no worse outcomes (that they could not get without cooperation 
of the coalition)? 
 
The naïve Gale-Shapely play by boys allows for no coalitions including boys, since 
boys do not face decision points. 
 
Under the top-trading-cycles method however, such arrangement could be attained.  
 
Example 6.3 (coalition of b2 and g2) 
 
Say the preference lists are as follows. 
 
Preference of boys, in descending order (only relevant ones): 
Pb1 g4, g5 
Pb2 g1, g3, g4 
Pb3 g1, g2 
Pb4 g2, g3 
Pb5 g5, g2, g4, g1 
 
Preference of girls, in descending order (only relevant ones): 
Pg1 b5, b3, b2, 
Pg2 b3, b5, b4 
Pg3 - 
Pg4 b2, b5, b1 
Pg5 b1, b5 
 
Consider the following four alternative plays.  
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The first one is the naïve Gale-Shapely for all players. 
 
Round b1: b1g4. 
Round b2: b2g1. 
Round b3: b3g1|b2g3. 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: b5g5. 
 
Here all boys get their first preference, except b2 who gets his second at g3. Girl g2 
gets her second preference b5. 
 
The second play involves b2 colluding with g2 as follows (deviations from Gale-
Shapely are in bold): 
 
Round b1: b1g4. 
Round b2: b2g1. 
Round b3: b3g1|b2g4|b1g5. 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: 
b5g5(b1)|b5g2(b4)|b5g4(b2)|b5g1|b3g2| b4g3. 
 
Here g2 played strategically, refusing b5 even though he was preferred over b4, 
ending up however with her first preference, namely b1. Under this play, boy b5 can 
trade g1 (his 4th preference) for g4 (his 3rd preference), under the trading cycle 
g1|b5g4|b2g1, which causes b2 to upgrade from g4 (his 3rd preference) to g1 (his 
1st preference).  Any other trading cycle for b5 would have to involve either b1 (who 
gets his 2nd preference and cannot get his first one being occupied by b2) or b4 (who 
gets his 2nd preference and whose first preference would be what b5 also wants). Thus 
the trading cycle which gives b2 his 1st preference, g1, would materialize under the 
top-trading-cycles method!  
 
Note that both b2 and g2 have to collude to obtain this outcome. Just one of them 
deviating was not enough. 
 
Consider the play where just b2 deviated: 
 
Round b1: b1g4. 
Round b2: b2g4|b1g5. 
Round b3: b3g1. 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: b5g5(b1)|b5g2| b4g3. 
 
Here g2 end up with b5 (her 2nd choice, not the first as before) and b2 cannot trade 
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with b3 for their common first choice, b1. 
 
If b2 does not deviate, g2 has no opportunity to deviate since she receives a single 
proposal, namely from b4. 
| 
Discussion: In this example, once b2 decided to deviate, it was optimal for g2 to also 
deviate. However, the preferences could easily have been adjusted to make b5 girl 
g2’s true first preference and b3 her true second preference. In this case, cooperation 
was also required of her. She must promise that she will refuse her true first choice in 
order to get her second one, still improving over her at least third one if b2 did not 
deviate in the first place. Philosophically note that b2 can, under this coalition, get his 
beloved g1 to whom he may be the last preference! In fact, b2 may be the last 
preference of all girls, save for g4 where he can be third last. 
 
Note that the above collusion can be materialized merely by b2 and g2 falsifying their 
preference lists – this way the top-trading-cycles method as applied in [7] will produce 
the coalition result for b2 and g2.  
 
Can such a situation occur for the coalition stable matching under Algorithm 3.22? We 
have already seen in Example 3.24 (lies of b2) that a single boy can play strategically 
without the help of any girl. However, could the help of a girl he can reward prove 
necessary? The answer is yes. 
 
Example 6.4 (another coalition of b2 and g2) 
 
Say the preference lists are as follows. 
 
Preference of boys, in descending order (only relevant ones): 
Pb0 g4, g0 
Pb1 g4, g5 
Pb2 g1, g3, g4 
Pb3 g1, g2, g3 
Pb4 g2, g0, g1 
Pb5 g5, g2, g0 
 
Preference of girls, in descending order (only relevant ones): 
Pg0 b5, b2, b4 
Pg1 b0, b4, b3, b2 
Pg2 b5, b3, b4 
Pg3 - 
Pg4 b0, b1 
Pg5 b1, b5 
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Assume the players b2 and g2 submitted falsified preference list, switching the order of 
the bolded preferences.  
 
Over the falsified preference lists, the outcome is as follows. 
 
Iteration 1: 
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
Round b2: b2g1. 
Round b3: b3g1|b2g4(b0)|b2g0. 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: b5g5(b1)|b5g2|b4g0(b2)|b4g1|b3g2(b5)|b3g3. 
 
The hopeless man is b3. He remains coupled with g3. 
 
Iteration 2:  
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
Round b2: b2g1. 
 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: b5g5(b1)|b5g2|b4g0. 
 
The hopeless men are b2 and b4. They remain coupled with g1 and g0 
respectively. 
 
Iteration 3:  
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
 
 
 
Round b5: b5g5(b1)|b5g2. 
 
The hopeless man is b5. He remains coupled with g2. 
 
Iteration 4:  
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
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The hopeless man is b1. He remains coupled with g5. 
 
Iteration 5:  
Round b0: b0g4. 
 
 
 
 
 
The hopeless man is b0. He remains coupled with g4. 
 
Iteration 6: 
<there are no more boys remaining> 
Thus the final Result = {b0-g4; b1-g5; b2-g1; b3-g3; b4-g0; b5-g2}, where the 
strategic player b2 gets his first preference and also girl g2 gets her second 
preference. 
 
Now consider the iterations of Algorithm 3.22 if only b2 deviated, but girl g2 did not 
also alter her preferences. 
 
Iteration 1: 
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
Round b2: b2g1. 
Round b3: b3g1|b2g4(b0)|b2g0. 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: 
b5g5(b1)|b5g0(b2)|b5g2|b4g0(b2)|b4g1|b3g2|b5g0|b2g3. 
 
The sole hopeless man is b2. He remains coupled with g3. 
 
Iteration 2: 
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
 
Round b3: b3g1. 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: b5g5(b1)|b5g0. 
 
The hopeless men are b3, b4 and b5. They remain coupled with g1, g2 and g0 
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respectively. 
 
Iteration 3: 
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
 
 
 
 
The sole hopeless man is b1. He remains coupled with g5. 
 
Iteration 4: 
Round b0: b0g4. 
 
 
 
 
 
The sole hopeless man is b0. He remains coupled with g4. 
 
 
Iteration 6: 
<there are no more boys remaining> 
Thus the final Result = {b0-g4; b1-g5; b2-g3; b3-g1; b4-g2; b5-g0}. Notice how in 
this matching b2 would get his mere 2nd preference g3, instead of g1. Notice 
also how girl g2 would get her at least third preference, b4. 
 
However, if only b2 does not deviate, the outcome is as follows. 
 
Iteration 1:  
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
Round b2: b2g1. 
Round b3: b3g1|b2g3. 
Round b4: b4g2. 
Round b5: b5g5(b1)|b5g0. 
 
The hopeless men are b2, b4 and b5. They remain coupled with g3, g2 and g0 
respectively. 
 
Iteration 2:  
Round b0: b0g4. 
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Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
 
Round b3: b3g1. 
 
 
The sole hopeless man is b3. He remains coupled with g1.  
 
Iteration 3: 
Round b0: b0g4. 
Round b1: b1g4(b0)|b1g5. 
 
 
 
 
The sole hopeless man is b1. He remains coupled with g5. 
 
Iteration 4: 
Round b0: b0g4. 
 
 
 
 
 
The sole hopeless man is b0. He remains coupled with g4. 
 
 
Iteration 6: 
<there are no more boys remaining> 
Thus the final Result = {b0-g4; b1-g5; b2-g3; b3-g1; b4-g2; b5-g0}. Notice how in 
this matching b2 would get his mere 2nd preference g3, instead of g1. Notice 
also how girl g2 would get her at least third preference, b4. 
 
Thus, b2 and g2 need each other to attain a better outcome for both. 
| 
Discussion: Note that in this examples, once b2 decides to deviate, it is in the best 
interest of g2 to also deviate. However, could any cases arise when if b2 deviates and 
girl g2 betrays, g2 might get a better outcome? We leave this question open. Note also 
that, as in Example 3.24 (lies of b2), the actions of player b2 are prohibited under 
Assumption 3.20 (no relative suicidal plays).  
 
Advancing to the general model, we note that here it can prove even more useful for 
boys to have girls in their coalitions: girls might lie that they prefer one (or some) of the 
coalition boys over an external player (that they actually want to end up with) thus 
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facilitating his cooption. If the external player knows that the girl is lying, the girl can still 
punish him in case he does not cooperate with the coalition by actually changing her 
preferences as she threatened. How could such a girl be coopted herself in the 
coalition? Well, it could be that without the help of the coalition that external boy might 
never propose to her: if she refuses to cooperate, some boy from the coalition might 
leave to the external boy a better preference for him (where he would be preferred over 
the external player) such that the non-cooperating girl never gets a proposal from him. 
New standoff situations might arise. Furthermore, since girls are allowed to be players, 
girls might cooperate with each other to blackmail boys into joining coalitions of their 
own (e.g. by threating to collectively refuse other boys - which end up occupying the 
non-cooperators’ “higher ups” and then also collectively refuse them as well). Girls may 
also blackmail or coopt each other! If a grand coalition of girls forms, that coalition can 
force any result beyond the first round of proposal by boys (those at time index 0) 
under Dynamic Game Model 4.6. If they are allowed to refuse even the first proposal, 
then a grand coalition of girls can force its desired outcome on boys, under Dynamic 
Game Model 4.6. In real life situations however, in such situations boys may also be 
allowed to stop proposing, in which case new standoff situations might ensure between 
coalitions: for example, between a grand coalition of all boys versus a grand coalition 
of all girls; but this is not the only situation. 
 
We leave the problem of analyzing the general model of play when girls are considered 
players alongside boys for future research. 
 
Partial information about preferences 
 
The ultimate variation which can be bought to the game involves players having to 
decide their strategy without having perfect knowledge about each other’s preferences. 
 
The imperfect information variation allows several situations to arise: 
 Players knowing only part of the order relations in the preference lists of other 
boys; 
 Players knowing some order relations wrongly when it comes to the preference 
lists of some other player. 
Similar situations can arise regarding the preference lists of girls. All these situations 
can occur in whatever combination. Note that situations where just some order 
relationships in the preference list of a boy not known (with the rest being known 
correctly), open the possibility for that boy to lie about such. Of course, he may not 
know what part of his preferences is known and what part is not known. Other players 
might also share information (or lies) about others’ preferences. Finding out the liars 
under certain assumptions is an interesting problem in itself and can be the object of 
future research. 
 
In the case of naïve Gale-Shapely, coalitions of boys do not collectively (all players) 
stand to benefit from falsifying their preference lists when external players are naïve, 
as was shown by Dubins and Freedman in [3 - Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley 
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Algorithm, L. E. Dubins and D. A. Freedman, 1981]. As discussed in Section 3 
however, coalitions could improve the outcome for some of their members, not all. 
Same is true for the top-trading-cycles method. Furthermore, when dynamic strategy 
profiles are allowed, a coalition may stand to benefit by submitting falsified preference 
lists if it causes the external players to deviate from Gale-Shapely, as with Example 4.9 
(devilish alliance). Even when only static strategy profiles are permitted, a boy might be 
convinced that it is useless for him to play at a certain higher-preferred girl since he 
would definitely (and truly) not get her anyway (as with the case of b1 in both situations 
of Example 4.9). 
 
We have already shown in Example 3.24 (lies by b2) how wrong knowledge of some 
player’s preferences can lead to better outcomes for him in the coalition stable 
matching of Algorithm 3.22. We have also shown how wrong knowledge of the 
preference lists of both boys and girls can lead to better outcomes for them, under top-
trading-cycles and coalition stable matching. The examples used there can be very 
easily adjusted to cases where only boys lie about their preferences: by imposing that 
girls actually have as preference their altered lists. This also applies to cases where 
their preferences are only partially known (with no incorrect knowledge), so long as the 
known parts are not the ones altered when lying.  
 
In most cases players may submit static strategy profiles which are openly different 
from their true preference lists. Thus, they may “lie” openly. In this case other players 
may adjust their own strategies based on the static strategy profiles submitted 
(assuming they know them, of course). Players may still yet try to gain advantages by 
convincing a set of players that they will have a certain static strategy profile and 
another set that they will have a different static strategy profile, incompatible with the 
first, thus hoping to gain the cooperation of both groups. They may similarly lie about 
their true preference order. 
 
The general play case is further complicated by wrong or imperfect knowledge of 
information. Some situations when girls were considered players (being able to adapt 
their preference lists) might as well apply in the case of imperfect knowledge of their 
preferences, when they are still robotic players: a boy or a coalition of boys may not 
know if a girl’s true preferences are the ones which she would use (in the case with her 
being non-robotic) with him (them) cooperating or the ones she would use with him not 
cooperating. Thus an ambiguity might arise where priory there was a standoff. Knowing 
the preference lists of girls wrongly can also naturally affect outcome (for example 
forcing some girl-optimal matching to be played out first). Also, when the preference 
lists of boys are partially or incorrectly known, players might tell different lies (or the 
truth) to different other players so that they convince them all that they face a credible 
threat – or a credible promise of improvement, respectively. If the truth is not known, 
any of these lies could actually be the truth. Players who are desperate to avoid some 
outcome of a materialized threat play might accept even the possibility of the lie being 
truthful as a sufficient deterrent.  
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We leave open the subject of fully analyzing strategic play in cases of impartial 
information about preference lists. It can form the topic of future research. 
 
We conclude this section here. 
 
7. ECONOMIC MODELING AND APPLICATIONS 
 
In this section we state a few real-life games and discuss how they can be modeled 
and resolved as instances of a stable marriage problem. 
 
Renter – Landlord 
 
In this problem, there are several homes which are owned by certain landlords. There 
are also several potential renters each of which ranks the homes on the market in 
some order, potentially different from the others. One renter for example might 
appreciate a sea-side view very much; another might appreciate a large home; and yet 
another might appreciate being close to his working place. Based on their appreciation 
of the homes and their own budgets, renters are willing to offer up until some maximum 
amount for renting a particular home. The landlords themselves may have a ranking 
over the renters, which may be based on factors such as how much they are willing to 
offer, weather they have pets or not, their credit rating, weather they have family and, 
not least, their personal feel of them.  
 
A stable marriage problem instance readily ensues, with renters as boys (making 
proposals) and landlords as girls (accepting proposals). 
 
One can see how all methods touched in this paper apply to this problem, including 
top-trading-cycles or the coalition stable matching of Section 3. Note the very important 
aspect that renters can benefits hugely from colluding, under both these methods. In 
fact, whenever a grand coalition ensues, the landlords get one single proposal. Thus, 
the renter proposing could offer a much lower budget! He no longer needs to outbid 
players who do not end-up with that landlord anyway. Furthermore, some players could 
receive side-payments from this economy (e.g. the hopeless men of prior iterations in 
Algorithm 3.22). The stable marriage problem modeling still holds since renters are 
assumed to care first and foremost about ending up in home they like. However, in 
such an extension (with side-payments from the economy) the last two situations 
described in Section 5 might arise: players could gain a preference for supporting 
someone who would make a higher side-payment. In cases where players care more 
about side-payments (above a certain threshold maybe), they may become drone 
players for the best paying player. Other forms of strategic plays and situations, like 
those discussed in Sections 4-6 might very well arise. 
 
The problem we call “art auction” where each boy has a fixed budget he wants to 
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spend on acquiring a certain piece of art to decorate his home and each art owner (girl) 
prefers the boys with the highest bid reduces to this one can also be modeled as a 
renter – landlord problem. 
 
Contractor – Project 
 
In this problem there are several contractors (either individual persons or 
organizations) which need to choose on which project they want to work. They may 
rank the available projects based on factor such as: maximum budget offered by the 
contracting authority; the counterparty risk of the contracting authority with regard to 
them; the required effort to gain all required skills and competences for the project; the 
marketing potential of the project (how likely is it to generate future great opportunities) 
and also personal relationships with the contracting authority. The contracting 
authorities may similarly rank contractors based on factors such as: the hourly / per 
project rate quoted by the contractor; the risks of the contractor not finishing the project 
in agreed terms; the location of the contractor or its employees (domestic/foreign, 
within the constituency of the political sponsor of the contracting authority or not, etc.); 
the level of security clearance of the contractor or its general trustworthiness with 
certain types of classified information; prospects for further benefits by engaging in a 
relationship with the contractor (e.g. fiscal facilities, political alliances, etc.) and, of 
course, personal feel. We can assume that a contractor cannot take more than one 
project due to business constrains: such as actual operational leverage (free 
operational capacity) or regulatory constraints. 
 
Again the problem can readily can be formulated as a stable marriage problem, with 
either contractors or contracting authorities as boys and the others as girls. In most 
real-life cases it is contracting authorities who start tenders, thus assuming the role of 
girls.  
 
The problem is similar to the Renter – Landlord one, with contractors as renters. One 
difference is that in this case renters (contractors) do not make an economy when the 
landlord (contracting authority) receives only their offer, but instead make a bigger 
profit by bidding a higher budget. Unlike in Renter – Landlord, contractors interest for a 
particular project might change with the budget they could attain. So might the interest 
of the contracting authority change with the quote of a certain contractor. 
We can adapt Gale-Shapley to handle such cases: When more than one contractor 
proposes to the same contracting authority, the following happens: 
1. The contractors which proposed to the same contracting authority (including the 
one which may be tentatively matched to the project) quote a project budget 
(this is just a simulated run – the contracting authorities are not actually 
informed of this; their potential responses are assumed to be known), 
representing the minimal amount they would be willing to accept for that project, 
without considering other projects first. This quote must be lower than all 
previous quotes he made for that project (initially it can be up to the maximal 
budget of the contracting authority). The contracting authority is tentatively said 
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to be matched to the contractor which ranks best given these minimal bids (and 
considering all the other factors too, of course) – we assume that lower bids can 
only be better in the eyes of the contracting authority, no matter from whom. 
2. The contractors which are rejected in step 1 above become uncoupled.  
3. Contractors may propose to a contracting authority they proposed to before, 
however quoting the new lowest bid (which must be necessarily lower than the 
prior one). 
 
Observation 2.6 (non-decreasing temperature of girls) still holds, with properly 
adjusting the definition of a girl’s temperature to include, besides the boy, also his bid: 
contracting authorities (girls) get better and better matchings in term of boy-bid tuples. 
Also, all notations have to be extended to include the bid amount for a particular 
proposal besides the girl. Also, the (tentative or final) match for a boy needs to be 
defined to also include, besides the partner also the bid he used to get her. Under 
these adjustments all other results from Section 2 and Section 3 still hold: Lemma 2.9, 
Lemma 3.7, Observation 3.13, Lemma 3.14, Theorem 3.21, Observation 3.28 are all 
still valid, by the same proofs under the adjusted notations. Algorithm 3.22 is also 
runnable under the modified Gale-Shapely described above. Furthermore, all 
examples from the usual cases still apply to cases where players also place bids: we 
can consider that the maximal amount of any player’s bid is 0 (also the minimal). 
 
Note that the contractors also stand to gain a lot by colluding either by top-trading-
cycles or coalition-stable matching. Or by threat-making or any other form of strategic 
play for that matter, assuming of course it worked (produces the desired changes in the 
behavior of others). One clear benefit is that in a grand coalition of colluding players 
(as is the case with coalition-stable matching), each contracting authority gets 1 single 
bid for its project. Thus, in real-life play, that bid can be the maximum budget of the 
contracting authority.  
 
If the contractors are allowed to make side-payments in the same currency of the bid 
(or transferable from such) or to subcontract a project they were awarded the problem 
complicates further, becoming very similar to the problem of ads placement. 
 
The contractor – project problem is most relevant to large projects, such as those in 
the verticals of military, oil & gas, healthcare and to a lesser extent city management. 
 
Student - Program placement 
 
The classical problem of student-program placement can be stated as follows: there 
are n students competing for the (potentially multiple) slots of m University Programs 
(from different universities usually). Each student has a ranking preference over the 
programs and each University Program has a ranking preference over which students 
it wants to admit. 
 
The problem can be directly formulated as a stable marriage problem – with students 
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as boys and Universities as girls – under the variation discussed in Section 6 which 
allows girls to have multiple slots. 
 
This problem is also relevant for placing primary six students in secondary schools in 
Singapore, which served as one motivation for [9 - Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage 
Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications, Chung-Piaw Teo, Jay 
Sethuraman,Wee-Peng Tan, 1999]) and also for placing 8th grade graduates in high-
schools in Romania. The problem is also known as hospitals/residents problem, due to 
its application in the matching residents to hospitals by the non-profit organization 
National Resident Matching Program (NRMP) who uses the algorithm in [15 - The 
Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects 
of Economic Design, Alvin, Elliott Peranson, 1999]. 
 
Ads placement 
 
In the ads placement problem, there are n advertisers competing for m advertising 
slots. An advertising slot can be viewed as a time interval in which an advertisement is 
displayed in a given context (e.g. at a certain minute when a certain YouTube.com 
video is viewed by a user having certain characteristics – such as gender or age –, 
during a particular time interval – for example between 12:00 and 14:00 his local time). 
 
Advertiser have a strict preference over the advertisement slots, based on the utility 
they feel they derive from the ad being delivered in the slot’s context. This utility in turn 
may be based on factors such as: expected volume of purchases generated by the ad; 
branding benefits; costs of placing the ad. The advertisement slots also have a strict 
preference over the advertiser, based on criteria such as: amount of money the 
advertiser is willing to pay; the degree in which the advertiser content is expected to be 
relevant to viewers of the advertisement; the reputation of the advertiser; the suitability 
of the advertiser’s content for the viewers (e.g. how much does it annoy them to have 
their experience interrupted by the advertisement) and so on. 
 
This problem is in fact a variation of the Contractor – Project problem. 
 
A case where advertisers are allowed to make side payments in the same currency as 
that of the bid and furthermore their utility can be valued in units of the same currency, 
was discussed in [13 - Designing a strategic bipartite matching market, Rahul Jain, 
2007]. In this paper, Rahul Jain also noted other similar cases which were analyzed by 
other authors.  
 
This problem has directly applicability in online ads placement in Google’s AdSense 
program as claimed in [13 - Designing a strategic bipartite matching market, Rahul 
Jain, 2007] 
 
Wireless Communications 
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According to [16 - Matching and Cheating in Device to Device Communications 
Underlying Cellular Networks, Yunan Gu, Yanru Zhang, Miao Pan, Zhu Han, 2015], the 
stable marriage problem also has applications in optimizing the “the system throughput 
while simultaneously meeting the quality of service (QoS) requirements for both D2D users 
and cellular users (CUs)”. In this paper, the authors refer to the top-trading-cycles method 
of [10 - Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung 
Huang, 2006] to derive a “cheating matching”. Unbeknownst to them is that in this paper 
we provided a more realistic “cheating matching”, namely the coalition stable outcome of 
Algorithm 3.22. 
 
We conclude this section here. 
 
8. CONCLUSION AND FURTHER RESEARCH 
 
In this paper we achieved the following: 
 Provided an O(n2) algorithm which computes the coalition-stable matching under 
the assumption set of Section 3, about which we argued is more realistic than 
the one of the top-trading-cycles method used by [10 - Cheating by Men in the 
Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung Huang, 2006]. We have 
also shown a case where players can lie about their preferences to alter their 
outcome under this algorithm. 
 Analyzed in some detail the game model for when players are allowed to make 
credible threats which imply potential hurtful outcomes to themselves also. We 
also presented super-exponential time algorithm which computes a threat-
making strategy for a player b to get some girl g or better, which can, however, 
produces false negatives – cases where such a strategy exists but the algorithm 
did not find it.  
 We discussed six further possibilities which might affect the outcomes for some 
boy, namely adding/removing boys/girls, coopting players in coalitions without 
incentivizing them within the game and making use of drone players. We also 
showed how such possibilities might become available to some player from a 
motivational perspective of the involved. 
 We discussed in reasonable detail six major variations to the game model, 
namely girls with more slots, indifference in the preference lists of boys, boys 
not knowing about all the girls in play, boys not knowing about all other boys, 
girls as players and imperfect information. We provided examples to illustrate 
the impact such variations have on prior results. 
 We presented four real life games namely Renter-Landlord, Contractor – 
Project, Student – Program placement and Ads placement and analyzed how 
they can be modeled as stable marriage problem instances. In the course of 
doing this we also expanded the model to allow a seventh major variation, as 
discussed in Section 7 regarding the contractor – project problem. We also 
referenced a fifth game, namely Wireless Communications where our results 
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also apply. 
 
Throughout this paper we have left several open questions and topics for future 
research. They are summarized below: 
 Can the matching produced by Algorithm 3.22 be computed faster than O(n3)? 
 Is there an algorithm more efficient in terms of running time than walking the 
entire game DAG for determining iff there exists a resolution to standoffs which 
make a certain boy b certain to get some girl g or better under the assumption 
set of Section 4? What further assumptions would such an algorithm need to 
make? 
 Can the output of Algorithm 4.26 (expanding wrath approach) – namely the 
permutation under which a coalition expands – be computed by a more efficient 
algorithm in terms of running time? 
 For an augmented problem instance, is there an efficient algorithm for solving 
the game fully? What assumption does it need to make about standoffs 
resolution? 
 In case players are allowed to lie or not respond to agreement offers, how can 
this impact the algorithms presented?  
 Questions pertaining to situations when girls are players: 
o Is there an efficient algorithm for determining potential coalitions of girls, 
along with associated outcomes for when boys are assumed to be robotic 
naïve Gale-Shapely players? 
o What is an appropriate model for describing situations when girls are 
allowed to be players and form or join coalitions of other girls and boys? 
Is there an efficient algorithm for computing weather there exists a 
resolution to stand-offs such that a boy b gets girl g or better or, 
conversely, that girl g1 gets boy b1 or better under this model? 
 Question pertaining to partial information about preferences of other players: 
o When players can divulge (or lie about) some order relationships in their 
preference list to other players, how can liars be found out? Is there an 
efficient algorithm which determines that a player is lying? We strongly 
suspect a positive answer. 
o How can players speculate the lack of knowledge (or wrongful 
knowledge) of other players? Is there an efficient algorithm for computing 
an optimal (or at least a good) strategy for each player to make use of 
such shortcomings of others? What assumptions must it make? 
 
We conclude the paper here. 
References 
 
[1] –– College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage 
D. Gale and L. S. Shapley 
The American Mathematical Monthly 
Copyright (c) Mircea Digulescu 
- 87 - 
Vol. 69, No. 1 (Jan., 1962), pp. 9-15 
Published by: Mathematical Association of America 
DOI: 10.2307/2312726 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2312726 
Page Count: 7 
(brief: [1 - College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage, D. Gale and L. S. Shapley, 1962]) 
 
[2] - Stable marriage and indifference 
Robert W. Irving 
Discrete Applied Mathematics 
Volume 48, Issue 3, 15 February 1994, Pages 261-272 
doi:10.1016/0166-218X(92)00179-P 
(brief: [2 – Stable Marriage and indifference, Robert W. Irving, 1994]) 
 
[3] -  
Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm 
L. E. Dubins and D. A. Freedman 
The American Mathematical Monthly 
Vol. 88, No. 7 (Aug. - Sep., 1981), pp. 485-494 
Published by: Mathematical Association of America 
DOI: 10.2307/2321753 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2321753 
Page Count: 10 
(brief: [3 - Machiavelli and the Gale-Shapley Algorithm, L. E. Dubins and D. A. Freedman, 1981]) 
 
[4] - Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem 
David Gale and Marilda Sotomayor 
The American Mathematical Monthly 
Vol. 92, No. 4 (Apr., 1985), pp. 261-268 
Published by: Mathematical Association of America 
DOI: 10.2307/2323645 
Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2323645 
Page Count: 8 
(brief [4 - Ms. Machiavelli and the Stable Matching Problem, David Gale and Marilda Sotomayor, 
1985]) 
 
[5] - Marriage, honesty, and stability 
Nicole Immorlica MIT, Cambridge, MA 
Mohammad Mahdian MIT, Cambridge, MA 
SODA 2005 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms 
Pages 53-62 
ISBN:0-89871-585-7 
(brief [5 - Marriage, honesty, and stability, Nicole Immorlica, Mohammad Mahdian, 2005]) 
 
[6] - Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem 
Copyright (c) Mircea Digulescu 
- 88 - 
Alvin E Roth 
Journal of Economic Theory 
Volume 34, Issue 2, December 1984, Pages 383-387 
(brief [6 - Misrepresentation and stability in the marriage problem, Alvin E Roth, 1984]) 
 
[7] - Hard variants of stable marriage 
David F Manlove, Kazuo Iwama, Shuichi Miyazaki, Yasufumi Morita 
Theoretical Computer Science 
Volume 276, Issues 1–2, 6 April 2002, Pages 261-279 
doi:10.1016/S0304-3975(01)00206-7 
(brief [7 - Hard variants of stable marriage, David F Manlove, Kazuo Iwama, Shuichi Miyazaki, 
Yasufumi Morita, 2002]) 
 
[8] - The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem 
Alvin E Roth 
Journal of Economic Theory 
Volume 36, Issue 2, August 1985, Pages 277-288 
(brief: [8 - The college admissions problem is not equivalent to the marriage problem, Alvin E Roth]) 
 
[9] - Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications 
Chung-Piaw Teo 
Jay Sethuraman 
Wee-Peng Tan 
Permalink: http://dx.doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.47.9.1252.9784 
Received: January 1, 1999 
Published Online: September 1, 2001 
Page Range: 1252 - 1267 
(brief: [9 - Gale-Shapley Stable Marriage Problem Revisited: Strategic Issues and Applications, Chung-
Piaw Teo, Jay Sethuraman,Wee-Peng Tan, 1999]) 
 
[10] - Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm 
Chien-Chung Huang 
Algorithms – ESA 2006 
14th Annual European Symposium, Zurich, Switzerland, September 11-13, 2006. Proceedings 
pp 418-431 
DOI 10.1007/11841036_39 
Print ISBN 978-3-540-38875-3 
(brief [10 - Cheating by Men in the Gale-Shapley Stable Matching Algorithm, Chien-Chung Huang, 
2006]) 
 
[11] - Pareto Optimality in House Allocation Problems 
David J. Abraham, Katarína Cechlárová, David F. Manlove, Kurt Mehlhorn 
Algorithms and Computation 
16th International Symposium, ISAAC 2005, Sanya, Hainan, China, December 19-21, 2005. 
Proceedings 
Copyright (c) Mircea Digulescu 
- 89 - 
DOI 10.1007/11602613_115 
Print ISBN 978-3-540-30935-2 
(brief [11 - Pareto Optimality in House Allocation Problems, David J. Abraham, Katarína Cechlárová, 
David F. Manlove, Kurt Mehlhorn, 2005]) 
 
[12] – A Survey of the Stable Marriage Problem and Its Variants 
Kazuo Iwama, Shuichi Miyazaki 
Informatics Education and Research for Knowledge-Circulating Society, 2008. ICKS 2008. 
International Conference on 
Publisher: IEEE 
DOI: 10.1109/ICKS.2008.7 
Print ISBN: 978-0-7695-3128-1 
(brief [12 - A Survey of the Stable Marriage Problem and Its Variants, Kazuo Iwama, Shuichi Miyazaki, 
2008]) 
 
[13] - Designing a strategic bipartite matching market 
Rahul Jain 
Decision and Control, 2007 46th IEEE Conference on 
Publisher: IEEE 
DOI: 10.1109/CDC.2007.4434797 
Print ISSN: 0191-2216 
(brief [13 - Designing a strategic bipartite matching market, Rahul Jain, 2007]) 
 
[14] - The Ford-Fulkerson method 
TH Cormen, CE Leiserson, RL Rivest, C Stein 
Introduction to Algorithms, 2001 
(brief [14 - The Ford-Fulkerson method, TH Cormen, CE Leiserson, RL Rivest, C Stein, 2001]) 
 
[15] – The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects of 
Economic Design 
Alvin; Elliott Peranson  
The American Economic Review. 89 (4): 756–757. doi:10.1257/aer.89.4.748 
September 1999 
(brief [15 - The Redesign of the Matching Market for American Physicians: Some Engineering Aspects 
of Economic Design, Alvin, Elliott Peranson, 1999]) 
 
[16] - Matching and Cheating in Device to Device Communications Underlying Cellular Networks 
Yunan Gu ;  Yanru Zhang ;  Miao Pan ;  Zhu Han 
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications ( Volume: 33, Issue: 10, Oct. 2015 ) 
DOI: 10.1109/JSAC.2015.2435361 
Print ISSN: 0733-8716 
(brief [16 - Matching and Cheating in Device to Device Communications Underlying Cellular 
Networks, Yunan Gu, Yanru Zhang, Miao Pan, Zhu Han, 2015]) 
